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INTRODUCTION
I came out as transgender in the middle of law school.' Trying to
learn more about myself, I read cases about transgender people.' Unfor-
tunately, I realized that how the law saw me was vastly different from
how I saw myself. Most of the transgender people I know are not accu-
rately reflected in the law.
The law paints a specific picture of transgender people, a picture in
which all transgender people look the same. In the law, most trans-
gender people are male to female (MTF).4 And most MTFs in the law
are women stuck in men's bodies, are very feminine heterosexual
women, and want every possible surgical intervention.5 Certainly, there
2. I use the word transgender very broadly to refer to people whose gender identity
and/or expression does or is perceived to not match stereotypical gender norms asso-
ciated with their birth-assigned gender. Some people who fit the above definition do
not self-identify as transgender. For instance, all masculine women fit the above defi-
nition of transgendcr, yet not all masculine women identify as transgender.
3. Eg., Schwenk v. Hartford, 204 F.3d 1187, 1201 (9th Cir. 2000); Ulane v. E. Air-
lines, Inc., 742 F.2d 1081 (7th Cir. 1984); Rentos v. OCE-Office Sys., 72 Fair
Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) 1717 (S.D.N.Y. 1996); Littleton v. Prange, 9 S.W.3d 223
(Tex. Ct. App. 1999); J.D. v. Lackner, 80 Cal. App. 3d 90 (Ct. App. 1978); Frances
B. v. Mark B., 355 N.Y.S.2d 712 (Sup. Ct. 1974); M.T. v. J.T., 355 A.2d 204 (N.J.
Super. Ct. App. Div. 1976).
4. See, e.g., all cases supra note 3, except Frances B. v. Mark B. A male to female trans-
gender person (MTF) is a person who was assigned male at birth but identifies as
female. A female to male transgender person (FTM) is a person who was assigned fe-
male at birth but identifies as male. I frequently encounter people who do not know
that FTMs exist. I am a FTM transgender person, and for most of my life, I did not
know that FTMs existed. For more literature about FTMs, see, for example, LESLIE
FEINBERG, TRANS LIBERATION: BEYOND PINK AND BLUE (1998). See also, LOREN
CAMERON, BODY ALCHEMY: TRANssExuAL PORTRAITS (1996); FINDING THE REAL
ME: TRUE TALES OF SEX AND GENDER DIVERSITY (Tracie O'Keefe & Katrina Fox,
eds., 2003).
5. To be a "real woman" or a "real man," one has to undergo coundess medical proce-
dures to alter one's body to make it more stereotypically female or male-and even
that may not be enough. See, e.g., In re Gardiner, 42 P.3d 120, 122-24 (Kan. 2002);
Littleton, 9 S.W.3d at 223. To be a "real man," one has to be heterosexual. See, e.g.,
Frances B., 355 N.Y.S.2d at 713-18, MT., 355 A.2d at 210. To be a "real woman,"
one has to be heterosexual. Littleton, 9 S.W.3d at 225. To make one a "real man," the
size and shape of one's genitalia are key. See, e.g., Frances B., 355 N.Y.S.2d at 118;
Kantaras v. Kantaras, No. 98-5375, slip op. at 40-55 (Fla. Cit. Ct. 2003), available
at http://www.transgenderlaw.org/cases/kantarasopinion.pdf (Kantaras is a great im-
provement by not requiring genital surgery). To be a "real man," one has to fit sexist
gender stereotypes. Kantaras, No. 98-5375, slip op. at 64, 795. Some articles discuss-
ing transgender people consider only MTFs, or use MTFs as the main examples. See,
e.g., Ronald R. Garet, Self-Transformability, 65 S. CAL. L. REv. 121, 126, 130, 135,
20051
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are transgender people who fit he above description, but there are also
many transgender people who fit only part or none of the above.
I felt invisible. This invisibility has pros and cons. If one is reflected
by the dominant discourse, one is validated. If one is reflected by the
dominant discourse, one may also be co-opted. But, if one is not recog-
nized as existing by the law, one is not protected by the law. As long as
the law sees only a small part of the transgender communities, many
transgender people are left without legal recourse. When courts only
recognize as 'real' those transgender people who fit narrow gender
stereotypes, have multiple medical interventions, and engage in hetero-
sexual intercourse, then courts only grant custody, health benefits, and
employment protections to transgender people who fit narrow gender
stereotypes, have multiple medical interventions, and engage in hetero-
sexual intercourse. Those clients of mine who do not fit the above
requirements cannot make use of the legal protections.6 As a legal advo-
cate for transgender people, this is a concern I face every day.
Transgender people are hurt every day. Gwen Araujo was a young
transgender woman who was brutally murdered by her transphobic
classmates in the San Francisco Bay Area in 2003.' And Gwen is not
alone. Each month a transgender person is murdered simply for being
themselves.8 Most transgender people have been or will be the target of a
142, 145, 151, 153 (1991) (asking how the lives and actions of transgender people
should be regarded morally by using solely MTF examples). See also Kevin Tallent,
My 'Dude Looks Like a Lady:' The Constitutional Void of Transsexual Marriage, 36 GA.
L. REv. 635 (2002) (discussing the implications of In Re Gardiner, using primarily
MTF examples).
In case law, "real man" and "real woman" are the only two gender options.
There exists no case in the United States that even considers any other alternatives.
Yet, in a recent San Francisco Human Rights Commission survey, about half of the
transgender identified people did not identify as strictly female or male. S.F. HuMAN
RIGHTS COMM'N, GENDER NEurAL. BATHROOM SURVEY (2001), at http://www.
transgenderlawcenter.orgldocuments/safeWC-survey.rcsults.html.
6. I estimate that only about 2% of my clients have had genital surgery. Approximately
50% of my clients have had some form of medical intervention. The medical inter-
vention requirement, and in particular the genital surgery requirement, makes it
especially difficult for many of my clients to make use of protective laws.
7. See, e.g., Henry Lee, Murder TrialJury Selection, S.F. CHRON., Mar. 16, 2004, at B1.
Gwen Araujo was a high school student in Newark, CA. She was beaten and stran-
gled to death at a party by her classmates, while other classmates watched.
8. Gwendolyn Smith and Ethan St. Pierre provide the most comprehensive list of trans-
gender people who have been murdered, approximately one person a month. Gender
Education & Advocacy, Trans Murder Statistics: 1970 to 2004, at
http://www.gender.org/resources/dge/gea02002.pdf (last visited Mar. 31, 2005). For
a list of names, please see Gwendolyn Ann Smith, Remembering Our Dead, at
http://www.gender.org/remember/# (last visited Apr. 5, 2005). Gwen Smith also
started the Annual 'Day of Remembrance,' a day to remember the many transgender
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hate crime in their lives.9 Calling the police is not always an effective
option. In San Francisco, approximately 50% percent of the violence
against transgender people is perpetrated by the police. 1
Transgender people are discriminated against in many areas of life,
from employment and housing, to health care and custody rights. Even
in San Francisco, one of the most transgender friendly cities, over 50%
of transgender people have experienced employment discrimination."
people who have died because of transphobia. Last year, I was scheduled to do a
transgender know-your-rights workshop with a local transgender activist. She did not
make it to the workshop because, that day, she was beaten so badly that she was un-
conscious for days. On August 13, 2004, a transgender woman, Delicious Green, was
murdered in San Francisco. Press Release, Community United Against Violence
(Aug. 2004) (on file with author). Michelle Paz was also murdered because of tran-
sphobia. Amnesty International, Venezuela: Possible extrajudicial execution! Fear for
safety, at http://web.amnesty.orgllibrary/index/engAMR530012002?open&of=
eng-38 4 (Feb. 12, 2002). Bibi Barajas was shot to death in 2002. Human Rights
Campaign, Transgender Basics, at http://www.hrc.org/Content/NavigationMenu/
HRC/GetInformed/Issues/TransgenderIssues 1/TransgenderBasics/Transgender_.
Basics.htm (last visited Nov. 1, 2004).
9. ELLA BAKER CENTER FOR HUMAN RIGHTS AND TRANSACTION, WALKING WHILE
TRANSGENDER: LAW ENFORCEMENT HARASSMENT OF SAN FRANCISCO TRANS-
GENDERITRANSSEXUAL COMMUNITY (2000).
10. Approximately 50% of the calls that the agency Community United Against Violence
(CUAV) receives from transgender people are calls in which the perpetrators of the
violence are law enforcement agents. Id. A nationwide survey of violence against
LGBT people found that 40% of police-initiated violence was directed at transgender
people. NATIONAL COALITION OF ANTI-VIOLENCE PROGRAMS, ANTI-LESBIAN, GAY,
BISEXUAL, AND TRANSGENDER VIOLENCE IN 1998 (1999), available at
http://www.avp.org/publications/reports/1998ncavpbiasrpt.pdf. In 1999, Victoria
Schneider, a transgender woman, sued the San Francisco Sheriffs Department for
doing an unnecessary strip search and harassing her. Ms. Schneider won the suit. Bill
Wallace, 750,000 Awarded for Strip-Search by Sheriffs Department, S.F. CHRON., Apr.
20, 1999, at Al 5.
11. NAT'L CTR. FOR LESBIAN RIGHTS AND THE TRANSGENDER LAW CTR., TRANS REALI-
TIES: A LEGAL NEEDS ASSESSMENT OF THE SAN FRANCISCO TRANSGENDER
COMMUNITIES (2003), available at http://nclrights.org/publications/
transrealities0803.htm; see PATRICK LETILLIER & YSEfqio V. LEWIS, HUMAN RIGHTS
COMMISSION, CITY AND COUNTY OF SAN FRANCISCO, ECONOMIC EMPOWERMENT
FOR THE LGBT COMMUNITIES (2000), available at http:/lwww.sfgov.orglsite/
search.asp?q=economic+empowerment (reported that 70% of self-identified trans-
gender respondents were found to be unemployed). The median income of
transgender people in San Francisco who are employed is between $744 (MTFs) and
$1100 (FTMs) per month. S.F. DEP'T OF PUBLIC HEALTH, THE TRANSGENDER
COMMUNITY HEALTH PROJECT: DESCRIPTIVE RESULTS (Feb. 18, 1999), at
http://hivinsite.ucsf.edu/InSite.jsp?doc=2098. 4 61e. The Transgender Law Center's
Trans Realities study found similar results: Sixty-four percent of survey respondents
reported annual incomes of $25,000 or less. NAT'L CTR. FOR LESBLAN RIGHTS AND
TRANSGENDRR LAW CTR., supra. In Washington, D.C., 42% of the transgender sur-
2005]
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One client of mine worked at a local establishment for 15 years, got
promotions and raises, and built her entire life around her work. Yet, the
day she told her employer that she is transgender, she was fired. Unfor-
tunately, this is not an uncommon story.12 Discrimination in
employment makes housing and health care difficult. In San Francisco,
47% of male to female transgender people, and 20% of female to male
transgender people have no housing or only unstable housing." Many of
my clients are denied access to homeless shelters. In San Francisco, 51%
of transgender people do not have health insurance. 4 Even if one has
health insurance, one is not guaranteed treatment. Robert Eads, a female
to male transperson who developed ovarian cancer, was denied treat-
ment by over twenty doctors and died, untreated. 5
vey respondents were unemployed, and 31% reported an annual income of less than
$10,000 per year. JESSICA XAVIER, THE WASHINGTON TRANSGENDER NEEDS
ASSESSMENT SURVEY (2000), available at http://www.glaa.org/archive/2000/
tgneedsassessmentI 12.shtml. For an example of employment discrimination, see
The Associated Press, Transgender Podiatrist Settles Gender Discrimination Complaint
Against Hospital, Mar. 27, 2004, at http://www.hrc.org/Content/ContentGroups/
News3/2004_March/TransgenderPodiatristSettlesDiscrimination Complaint.ht
m (a transgender woman who was the director of the surgical residency program for
thirteen years was fired two weeks after disclosing that she is transgender).
12. At the Transgender Law Center, each month I saw at least one client who was fired
from their job because their employer is transphobic. Most of the employment dis-
crimination cases at the Employment Law Center's Lesbian Gay Bisexual and
Transgender Project involved gender identity discrimination. Conversation with
Sheryl Harris, Esq., Founder, LGBT Workers' Rights Project, in San Francisco, Cal.
(2002). An entire website, Transgender at Work, at http://www.tgender.net/
taw/tg.html (2001), is dedicated to navigating being transgender at work.
13. S.F. DEP'T OF PUBLIC HEALTH, THE TRANSGENDER COMMUNITY HEALTH PROJECT:
DESCRIPTIVE RESULTS, available at http://hivinsitc.ucsf.edu/InSite.jsp?doc=
2098. 4 61 e (Feb. 18, 1999). The Trans Realities study similarly found that 19% of re-
spondents lack stable housing. NAT'L CTR. FOR LESBIAN RIGHTS AND TRANSGENDER
LAW CTR., supra note 11.
14. S.F. DEP'T OF PUB. HEALTH, supra note 13. The Transgender Law Center's TransRe-
alities study found similarly that 46% of respondents lack health insurance. NAT'L
CTR. FOR LESBIAN RIGHTS AND TRANSGENDER LAW CTR., supra note 11. In Wash-
ington, D.C., almost 50% of the respondents had no health insurance, and 39% had
no doctor for routine care. XAVIER, supra note 11. Further, 58% of the respondents
who use hormones obtained them from friends or off the street. Id. In Los Angeles,
53% of female-to-male respondents had been denied medical services simply because
they are transgender. FTM Alliance of Los Angeles, Results of the 2003 Health Ac-
cess Survey (Mar. 2004). The Transgender Law Center has worked on several cases in
which people were told by health insurance companies that they were denied cover-
age because they are transgender.
15. For a documentary of his fight with ovarian cancer, see SOUTHERN COMFORT (New
Video Group 2001). Another FTM transgender person was denied coverage for uter-
ine cancer. His insurance company said that it "did not cover uteruses in men."
Interview with FTM, in San Francisco Bay Area (2001).
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Transgender youth are frequently harassed at school and so lose out
on their education, or their lives. A recent study found that 53% of stu-
dents did not feel their school was safe for gender non-conforming
boys.' 6 Californias Westminster School Board refused to enforce the
state's Student Safety and Violence Prevention Act of 2000,"7 which pro-
tects transgender and gender non-conforming students from harassment
and discrimination. 8 Westminster was willing to lose $40 million in
state funding to violate state law by failing to protect its transgender
students.19
This is only a small snapshot of the difficulties that many trans-
gender people face. Transgender people are hurt every day, and often
with no legal recourse. There are only four states that explicitly protect
transgender people in employment. ° California is the only state in the
United States that protects transgender and gender non-conforming
16. CAL. SAFE SCH. COALITION & THE 4-H CENTER FOR YouTH DE., UNIV. OF CAL.,
DAvis, A SAFE PLACE TO LEARNs: CONSEQUENCES OF HARAssMENT BASED ON ACTUAL
OR PERCEIVED SEXUAL ORIENTATION AND GENDER NoN-CONFoRMITY AND STEPS
FOR MAKING SCHOOLS SAFER 2 (2004). See OFFICE FOR PUB. POLICY OF THE GAY
LESBIAN AND STRAIGHT EDUCATION NETWORK, THE 2001 NATIONAL SCHOOL CLI-
MATE SURVEY, GAY LESBIAN AND STRAIGHT EDUCATION NETWORK (2001) (finding
that 74% of transgender youth reported being sexually harassed at school in the past
year, and 90% of transgender youth reported feeling unsafe at school because of their
gender expression).
Many transgender and gender non-conforming students do not feel safe going
to the restroom in their school. This is one of the biggest problems that students face.
GAY STRAIGHT ALLIANCE NETWORK, Focus GROUP RESULTS (Apr. 21, 2001). A
2001 Human Rights Commission survey found that transgender people are often
harassed and assaulted in both the men's and women's restrooms. S.F. HUMAN
RIGHTS COMM'N, supra note 5. Respondents to the survey illustrate the severity of the
problem caused by gender segregated bathrooms: "I have been slapped, pushed, and
dragged out," "I have spent so many hours avoiding bathrooms that I have damaged
my bladder and put pressure on my kidney." Id. One transgender person keeps a
bucket in his office, since he cannot safely go to either the women's or men's room in
his workplace. Interview, in San Francisco, Cal. (2001).
17. Assem. Bill 537, 1999-2000 Reg. Sess. (Cal. 1999) (amending CAL. EDuc. CODE
§200).
18. Joel Rubin, Beliefi Imperil Funding: Three of Five on an 0. C. School Board Reject a
State Gender Definition on Religious Grounds, L.A. TIMES, Mar. 14, 2004, at BI. In
response to Westminster, the California Department of Education issued a Legal Ad-
visory, stating that no school district could ignore state law. Legal Advisory Re:
Gender Equity and Discrimination Laws in California Public Schools (Apr. 30,
2004), available at http://www.cde.ca.gov/nr/relhtyrO4 trO4 30 .asp.
19. Rubin, supra note 18.
20. CAL. GOVT CODE § 12920 (1992); MINN. STAT. § 363A.03, subd. 44 (2004); N.M.
STAT. ANN. § 28-1-2(Q) (2000 & Supp. 2003); R.I. GEN. LAWS § 11-24-2.1(1)
(2002).
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students from discrimination and harassment." There are no laws that
protect transgender people from discrimination in health care. 22 Courts
are starting to rule for transgender people, but continue to do so in such
a way that only those transgender people who fit stereotypical gender
norms and want (and can afford) surgical procedures can make use of
the victories.23
This article examines two reasons why we are unable to transcend
current discriminatory laws, policies, and social practices: a view of gen-
der that does not recognize the existence of many transgender people,
and a prevailing perception both in the legal and medical communities
that there is a distinction between "gender" and "sex."
In Part I, the article first describes the many different ways in which
one can be transgender. Many transgender women and men defy gender
stereotypes. For instance, some male-to-female transgender people are
butch lesbians. Some female-to-male transgender people like to cook
and bake. And there are many transgender people who do not identify
as either female or male, but as a third or other gender, such trans or
boy-girl, just to name a few.24 Some transgender people choose to alter
their bodies medically, and some do not. Some transgender people want
to alter their genitalia, and some do not. Some transgender people are
21. See Assem. Bill 537, 1999-2000 Reg. Sess. (Cal. 1999) (amending CAL. EDUC. CODE
§ 200).
22. In California, Transgender Equality California, a coalition of activists and civil rights
organizations, is preparing to introduce the first transgender health insurance bill in
the United States. The bill would require health insurances to stop discriminating
against transgender people.
23. See supra note 5.
24. Several major newspapers have recently written about transgender people who do not
identify as strictly female or male. See, e.g., Fred A. Bernstein, On Campus, Rethinking
Biolgy 101, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 7, 2004, at 9.1 (showing how college campuses are
becoming more open to transgender people, including transgender people who do
not identify as female or male); Rona Marech, Nuances of Gay Identities Reflected in
New Language, S.F. CHRON., Feb. 8, 2004 at Al. (exploring different transgender
identities, particularly identities that go beyond the female-male binary). For more
discussion on gender identities that go beyond female and male, see KATE BORN-
STEIN, GENDER OUTLAW: ON MEN, WOMEN, AND THE REST OF US (1994)
[hereinafter BORNSTEIN, GENDER OUTLAW]; KATE BORNSTEIN, My GENDER WORK-
BOOK: HOW TO BECOME A REAL MAN, A REAL WOMAN, THE REAL YOU, OR
SOMETHING ELSE ENTIRELY (1998) [hereinafter BORNSTEIN, GENDER WORKBOOK];
PAT CALIFIA, SEX CHANGES: THE POLITICS OF TRANSGENDERISM (1997); FEINBERG,
TRANS LIBERATION, supra note 4; LESLIE FEINBERG, TRANSGENDER WARRIORS: MAK-
ING HISTORY FROM JOAN OF ARC TO DENNIS RODMAN (1996); FINDING THE REAL
ME, supra note 4; JAMISON GREEN, BECOMING A VISIBLE MAN (2004).
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straight, some are gay, some are bisexual, some are queer.
25 The ways to
be transgender are endless.
Part I next suggests a non-linear view of gender. Often, when we
get past the binary gender system, the notion that there are only two
genders, female and male, we do so by seeing gender as a spectrum or
line running from female to male.26 A conceptualization of gender that
runs from female to male is limiting because it does not leave space for
more complex genders. For instance, I have met many FTMs who are
less masculine than many butch women. Would the FTM fall more to-
wards the male end of the spectrum because the FTM identifies as male?
Would the butch woman fall more towards the male end of the spec-
trum because she is in fact more masculine? This linear ordering breaks
down quickly. I suggest a non-linear alternative conceptualization,
which I call the gender galaxy. The gender galaxy is a three-dimensional
non-linear space in which every gender has a location that may or may
not be fixed. For instance, butch woman is one particular gender loca-
tion. Feminine FTM is another gender location. These are two different
valid gender locations that are not linearly related.
In Part II, the article argues that the sex-gender distinction is not
part of the new conceptualization of gender, the gender galaxy. Within
the sex-gender distinction, sex is seen as physiological and anatomical,
and gender is seen as cultural and social. Gender is the cultural overlay
onto a scientific and objective sex. For instance, Mary Anne C. Case de-
fines sex as "the anatomical and physiological distinctions between
women and men" and gender as "the cultural overlay on those anatomi-
cal and physiological distinctions. ' , 27 Similarly, Francisco Valdes defines
25. There is a debate concerning the appropriate use of words such as "queer," "dyke,"
and "fag." These words can certainly be used as epithets. Some people within the
LGBT (Lesbian, Gay, Bisexual, and Transgender) communities prefer that people
outside of the LGBT communities not use these terms. Yet, within parts of the
LGBT communities, the words are reclaimed and used proudly. This article uses
"queer," "dyke," and "fag" in a celebratory, not derogatory, sense. For a more detailed
discussion, see Michelangelo Signorile, The Word 'Queer' Belongs in the Mainstream,
NEWSDAY, Nov. 25, 2003, at Al.
26. See e.g., Bernstein, supra note 24; Marech, supra note 24; Julie A. Greenberg, Defin-
ing Male and Female: Intersexuality and the Collision Between Law and Biology, 41
ARiz. L. Rav. 265, 275 (1999); Nancy Nangeroni, Int'l Found. for Gender Educa-
tion (IFGE), Transgender 101, at http://lgbtrc.ucr.edu/trans_101.html (last visited
Feb. 7, 2005); Cristan Williams, TG 101, at http://www.geocities.com/
gypsyrose 1972/tg_ 10 l.html (last visited Feb. 7, 2005).
27. Mary Anne C. Case, Disaggregating Gender from Sex and Sexual Orientation: The
Effeminate Man in the Law and Feminist Jurisprudence, 105 YAIE L.J. 1, 10 (1995)
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sex as the "physical attributes of humans" and gender as the "cultural
dimensions derived from and determined by sex. 28 Under this para-
digm, a person's genital configuration is sex, and a person's presentation
of themselves to the world is gender.
One of the most harmful underlying concepts that courts use is the
distinction between sex and gender.2 If we see sex as biology and gender
as a social construct, then we give sex more import and make it more
real. If sex, that which we are assigned at birth by doctors, 0 is seen as
more real, then transgender people's self-identification, which is differ-
ent from an assignment at birth, is necessarily seen as less real. This
distinction allows courts to see the transgender person's birth-assigned
sex as an ultimate truth that most likely cannot be overcome (and to
overcome it requires the testimony of a whole host of medical experts) .31
Halting the use of this distinction would do much to assure that more
(arguing that the sex-gender distinction is necessary to protect masculine women and
feminine men).
28. Francisco Valdes, Queers, Sissies, Dykes, and Tomboys: Deconstructing the Conflation of
"Sex," "Gender, "and "Sexual Orientation" in Euro-American Law and Society, 83 CAL.
L. REv. 1, 6 nn.5-6 (1995) Other writers similarly distinguish sex from gender: see-
ing sex as that which is more tied to biology and gender as that which is more tied to
culture. See, e.g., Greenberg, supra note 26, at 271; John M. Ohle, Note, Constructing
the Trannie: Transgender People and the Law Footnote, 8 J. GENDER RACE & JUST.
237, 243-45 (2004); Amy Sonnie, Queer 101: A Glossary, in REVOLUTIONARY
VOICES: A MULTICULTURAL QUEER YOUTH ANTHOLOcy, 245 (Amy Sonnic ed.,
2000); TransLife.net, Transgender 101, at http://www.translife.net/tgl0l/
basicdefs.htm (last visited Feb. 7, 2005).
29. Katherine Franke shows how the sex-gender distinction is harmful to the feminist
movement. If we view sex and gender as distinct, that means we view woman and
femininity and man and masculinity as distinct-where the former in each pairing is
seen as more natural, prior, and real than the latter-its cultural overlay. If we see sex
as more natural and real than gender, then we allow ourselves to question and desta-
bilize femininity and masculinity, but we do not allow ourselves to question anddestabilize woman and man. Yet, woman, man, and sex are socially constructed cate-
gories, constructed out of our gender norms. By keeping sex and gender distinct, we
set off sex as that natural reality which we do not question. In so doing, we limit our
ability to challenge gender norms. Katherine M. Franke, The Central Mistake of Sex
Discrimination Law: The Disaggregation of Sexjrom Gender, 144 U. PA. L. REv. 1, 1-
3 (1995) (showing how the sex-gender distinction is harmful to transgender people).30. We usually refer to that which we are assigned at birth as sex. This article argues
against the use of the concept sex. It argues that sex is nothing more than birth (and
other-, as opposed to self-) assigned gender. See Part II. Hence, that which we are all
assigned at birth I refer to as birth-assigned gender.
31. See, e.g., Kantaras v. Kantaras, No. 98-5375, slip op. at I (Fla. Cir. Ct. 2003);
Anonymous v. Weiner, 270 N.Y.S.2d 319, 321 (Sup. Ct. 1966); Frances B. v. Mark
B., 355 N.Y.S.2d 712, 717 (Sup. Ct. 1974); Hartin v. Dir. of Bureau of Records &
Statistics, 347 N.Y.S.2d 515, 518 (Sup. Ct. 1973); Littleton v. Prange, 9 S.W.3d
223, 225 (Tex. Ct. App. 1999).
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transgender people are protected by the courts, particularly transgender
people who cannot afford to or choose not to enter the medical system,
and so do not have a team of doctors available to testify on their behalf.
The sex-gender distinction also reinforces an environment that
places transgender people in physical danger. A significant amount of
violence against transgender people occurs because the perpetrator feels
that the transgender person has deceived them.32 The sex-gender distinc-
tion implies that transgender people are not who they say they are, that
their true, objective gender is the one they were assigned at birth. Thus,
the sex-gender distinction plays into a belief that transgender people are
deceitful, a belief that can cost transgender people their lives.
In Part III, after a brief overview of transgender law, the article
shows how much of current law and policy is, at best, inclusive and pro-
tective of only a portion of the transgender communities. Historically,
the courts ruled virtually unanimously against transgender people, and
did so in extraordinarily insulting ways." In the few instances when a
transgender person won in court, it was a transgender person who fit a
narrow view of what it means to be transgender 4 There have been ad-
vances in the last few years. Despite these advances, many current courts
32. The most explicit example is the case of Gwen Araujo. The defendants who mur-
dered her claimed as their justification that Gwen "deceived" them. See, e.g., Lee,
supra note 7. Another well-publicized tragedy is the murder of Tyra Hunter. Tyra
was in a car accident. When the paramedics who were called to the scene saw her
genitalia, they said that she was not a real woman-in other words, that she deceived
them by making them assume that she had one type of genitalia when she in fact had
another. They stopped helping her and let her die. For a community account, see
http://songweaver.com/genderlhunrer.html. The reporting in the Washington Post
further entrenches the incorrect belief that transgender people deceive. The Post used
Tyra's old name, Tyrone, in reporting her death and described her as a "man dressed
as a woman." Wendy Melillo, D.C. Fire Officials to Reinvestigate Transvestite's Death,
WASH. POST, Dec. 5, 1995, at B2. In doing so, the Post suggests that Tyra is deceiv-
ing, that Tyrone is her real name, and that she is really a man. My friends and I
commonly face the reaction that we are not who we say we are. Sometimes the reac-
tion is a violent one. Furthermore, I believe that much of the violence against
transgender people arises out of a person feeling they have been deceived rather than
that a gender norm has been violated. Hence, it is imperative that our society recog-
nize transgender people as being the gender that we say we are and that our society
changes its very narrow views of what it means to be a woman or a man.
33. For particularly insulting examples, see Ulane v. E. Airlines, Inc., 742 F.2d
1081, 1087 (7th Cir. 1984); Frances B., 355 N.Y.S. 2d at 712; Littleton, 9 S.W.3d
at 231.
34. See. e.g., M.T. v. J.T., 355 A.2d 204, 206 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1976).
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use the same limiting standards from thirty years ago, standards that rely
on the sex-gender distinction.3 5
This article urges litigators and policy makers to refrain from using
conceptualizations that are based on the sex-gender distinction. The ar-
ticle ends with additional suggestions of how to be more inclusive and
protective of the gender galaxy in order to ensure that every person's self-
identified gender is respected, that every person can express their gender
freely, from a fierce feminine transgender woman, a butch lesbian trans-
gender woman, a non-transgender female soccer star, a proudly not-
masculine transgender man, a flamey gay man, to a person whose gen-
der goes far beyond the female-male binary.
I. A CONCEPTUALIZATION OF GENDER THAT Is INCLUSIVE AND
RESPECTFUL OF TRANSGENDER PEOPLE
A. A Description of Transgender Communities
In order to be protective of transgender people, we have to know
who transgender people are. This article begins to describe the infinite
gender diversity within the transgender communities. 6
Transgender people span all communities, cultures, races, ages, sex-
ual orientations, and genders. This statement is fairly self-evident and
clear, except perhaps the last part of the sentence: Transgender people
have all genders.
35. see, e.g., In re Gardiner, 42 P.3d 120 (Kan. 2002); Goins v. West Group, 635
N.W.2d 717 (Minn. 2001).
36. Several recent authors, transgender authors and allies, in the legal field use the term
transgender broadly and recognize the diversity of the transgender communities. For
instance, Dean Spade shows that transgender and gender non-conforming people
make many different choices, for personal and/or economic reasons, about their bod-
ies and to what extent to enter the medical system. Dean Spade, Resisting Medicine,
Re/modeling Gender, 18 BERKELEY WOMEN'S L.J. 15 (2003). Paisley Currah and
Shannon Minter use the term transgender broadly: "pre-operative, post-operative and
non-operative transsexual people; cross-dressers; feminine men and masculine
women; intersexed persons; and more generally, anyone whose gender identity or ex-
pression differs from conventional expectations of masculinity or femininity." Paisley
Currah & Shannon Minter, Unprincipled Exclusions: The Struggle to Achieve Judicial
and Legislative Equality for Transgender People, 7 Wm. & MARY J. WOMEN & L. 37, 37
n. 1 (2000). Taylor Flynn uses transgender synonymously with "gender variant,"
gender non-conforming," and "trans," and shows that one's anatomy does not de-
termine one's gender identity. Taylor Flynn, Transforming the Debate: Why We Need
to Include Transgender Rights in the Struggles for Sex and Sexual Orientation Equality,
101 COLUM. L. Rav. 392, 395 n.2 (2001) (expanding and adding to the description
of gender diversity).
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1. Gender Diversity
Transgender people have all genders. Some transgender people are
male; some transgender people are female. Among non-transgender
people, there are feminine women, masculine women, androgynous
women, feminine men, androgynous men, masculine men, to name just
a few. Among transgender people as well, there are feminine women,
masculine women, androgynous women, feminine men, androgynous
men, masculine men, and many more. Some FTMs do drag in slinky
dresses, wear sparkly clothes while hiking in the woods, and host nail
polish parties. Some MTFs identify as butch dykes, play soccer, and
cringe at having to wear a skirt.7 There is infinite variation in the world.
We are all limited by imposing socialized binary gender norms on our
complex real life experiences. There are infinitely different women and
infinitely different men.3 8
37. Interviews at Transgender and LGBT Meetings, in San Francisco Bay Area: FTM
International, Transgender San Francisco, Community United Against Violence,
Tenderloin Aids Resource Center, UCSF Trans Women of Color Project, Youth
Gender Project, Lavender Youth Recreation and Information Center, United Gen-
ders of the Universe, Tom Waddell Health Clinic, Dimensions Health Clinic (2000-
2004); interviews at Transgender Conferences: True Spirit in Washington, D.C
(2001), FTM International Conference in Seatde, WA (2002), LGBT Health Sum-
mit in Boulder, CO (2002); interviews and conversations with over 1,000 clients and
workshop participants during my work at the Transgender Law Center (2002-2004)
[hereinafter Interviews]. See Dean Spade, MAKE-ZINE, at http://www.makezine.org;
Micah Timtum, A TsNS JEw ZINE (2000). See generally supra note 24.
In the next sections, I describe the gender diversity within the transgender
communities. Often, I will cite to this footnote and note 24. I would like to cite to
studies of how many transgender people identify outside the binary gender system, of
how many MTFs identify as butch women, and of FTMs who bear children. Unfor-
tunately, the transgender communities are under-researched, under-studied, under-
discussed, and under-funded. For instance, at this point, only one study exists on the
effect of hormone therapy on FTM transgender people. See Paul J. M. van Kesteren
et al., Mortality and Morbidity in Transsexual Subjects Treated With Cross-sex Hor-
mones, 47 CLINICAL ENDOCRINOLOGY 337 (1997). Mainstream press has only
recently begun writing about the non-binary diversity within the transgender com-
munities. See supra note 24. The more nuanced descriptions of transgender people
have not yet made it into mainstream press, but are readily talked about at meetings,
conferences, in one-on-one conversations, on e-mail lists, and the like. There are a
few anthologies and books in which transgender people describe their own lives and
describe themselves without simplifying. See, e.g., BORNSTEIN, GENDER OUTLAW, SU-
pra note 24; BORNSTEIN, GENDER WORKBOOK, supra note 24; CALIFIA, supra note
24; FEINBERG, TRAs LIBERATION, supra note 4; FINDING THE REAL ME, supra note 4.
38. Even in the law, there are masculine women and feminine men. See, e.g., Price
Waterhouse v. Hopkins, 490 U.S. 228 (1989); Rosa v. Park W. Bank & Trust Co.,
214 F.3d 213 (1st Cir. 2000). See generally, e.g., REVOLUTIONARY VOICES: A MULTI-
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And there are those who are neither. Some transgender people iden-
tify as trans, tranny, trannyboy, trannygirl, transsexual, transgender,
shinjuku boy, boi, grrl, boy-girl, girl-boy-girl, papi, third gender, fourth
gender, no gender, bi-spirit, butch, dyke-fag, fairy, elf girl, glitterboy,
transman, transwoman-just to name a few.39 On a San Francisco Hu-
man Rights Commission Survey one person described their gender as
"[h]ormonally enhanced, pre-op, trans, genderqueer, butch-dyke with
recurring femme moments! I'm just your average boy-girl-boy, really. ' 5
In conversations and community discussions, there are transgender
people who identify as both FTM and dyke. Some see themselves as
combining aspects of female and male. Some see themselves as falling
between female and male. Some see themselves as falling completely
outside of the binary gender system. Some who do not identify as
strictly female or strictly male identify as "genderqueer."4 Some do not
identify with that term."
I know I'm not a man-about that I'm very clear, and I've
come to the conclusion that I'm probably not a woman either
44
Author Leslie Feinberg "faces almost insurmountable difficulty
when instructed to check an 'F' or an 'M' box on identifica-
tion papers," and refers to hirself as sie.45
CULTURAL QUEER YOUTH ANTHOLOGY (Amy Sonnie ed., 2000); SANDRA LEE
BARTKY, FEMINITY AND DOMINATION: STUDIES IN THE PHENOMENOLOGY OF OP-
PRESSION (1990).
39. See supra note 24. See also S.F. HUMAN RIGHTS COMM'N, supra note 5 (in which
almost 500 people described their often complex and rich gender identities).
40. S.F. HUMAN RIGHTS COMM'n, Gender Neutral Bathroom Survey, Raw Data #37 (on
file with author). For summary of survey, see S.F. HUMAN RIGHTS COMM'N, supra
note 5.
41. Particularly dyke-FTM community forums such as "Gender Talk" (2001) organized
by the San Francisco Human Rights Commission, or the community forum organ-
ized by Seattle's FTM Conference (2002). See Jaron Kanegson, After the Butch/FTM
Conference: Why Not to Give UP on Butch/FTMITrannyboy Coalition Building, FTM
INT'L NEWSLETTER (FTM Int'l, S.F., Cal.), June 1998, at 5.
42. "Genderqueer" is a term that some who see themselves as falling outside of the fe-
male-male binary use to describe their gender identity, just as some who fall outside
of the gay-straight binary use "queer" to describe their sexual orientation. See infia
Part I.A.4 and infra note 59 for a discussion about the difference between gender
identity and sexual orientation.
43. Gender identification: I use the terms "identify as gender x" to refer to a person self-
naming and self-claiming their gender.
44. BORNSTEIN, GENDER OUTLAw, supra note 24, at 8.
45. FEINBERG, TRANS LIBERATION, supra note 4, at 1.
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2. Change and Fluidity
Some transgender people knew their true gender from the day they
were born. Some transgender people realize their genders later in life,
when they first meet another transgender person, through reading about
transgender people, or through a series of experiences." Just as there is
no one age at which gay or bisexual or queer people recognize and ac-
knowledge their sexual orientation, there is also no one age at which
transgender people recognize and acknowledge their gender identity.
Some transgender people know their gender at the age of three, some at
47
the age of fifteen years, some at the age of eighty-five years.
Further, a recognition of one's gender identity at one point in time
does not negate a different identification at a different point in time.
Some transgender people have the same gender throughout their lives.
Some have different genders at different times. Some FTMs identified as
women, and then identified as men. Some FTMs have always identified
as men. Some transgender people identify as male for part of their life,
as female for another part of their life, and later again as male.4" That
does not mean that there was a mistake. It simply means there was
change. Like so many things in life, and in fact, like every moment of
life, gender can change, and it can change more than once.
For some transgender people, gender identification varies fre-
quently. Some people's gender is situational.4 ' For instance, I identify in
the "male" region of the gender galaxy, but not really as female or male.
Once, a law school exercise required that students divide into groups of
women and men. I looked at the side of the room with the feminine
women. I looked at the side of the room with the masculine men. At
that point, I strongly identified as neither female nor male. That identi-
fication was both visceral and political. I needed more space. In that
gender normative space, I needed to create an opening.55 In contrast, at
one transgender meeting in San Francisco I was told that I was welcome
only if I did not identify as female or male. Here as well, I had a visceral
and political reaction. Again, I needed more space. In that space, the
46. See, e.g., FINDING THE REAL ME, supra note 4; Rim ANNE WILCHINS, READ My Lips
(1997); Sex, Lies and Darwin: Profile offoan Roughgarden (BBC television broadcast,
Jan. 26, 2004).
47. See Interviews, supra note 37. For futher examples, see the books cited in note 24.
48. See Interviews, supra note 37. For futher examples, see the books cited in note 24.
49. See Interviews, supra note 37. For futher examples, see the books cited in note 24.
50. I ended up standing in the middle of the room.
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male parts of my identity felt erased, so I needed to assert them. In that
space, I identified as male. My gender is situational.
Many transgender people's genders are situational. For instance,
some transgender people identify both as dyke and as FTM, more dyke
or more FTM depending on the situation. Some people wake up on
different days with slightly different genders. For some, gender is fixed,
and for some it is fluid.
3. Body Diversity
In addition to the enormous variety of identifications, there is an
equally impressive variety of bodies. Some women have wombs, some
do not. Some men have facial hair, some do not. Some transgender
women identify as one hundred percent female and never take hor-
mones or have any surgeries. Transgender women define for themselves
what it means to be female and to have a female body. Many trans-
gender people name and reclaim their body parts. Some FTM
transgender people take male hormones and have mastectomies and yet
do not identify as men. Some do. Some mix and match to best express
their gender. Some take hormones but have no surgery or vice versa.
Some take low-doses or go on and off of hormones. Some female to
male transgender men choose to become pregnant and bear and raise
children.5
When talking about bodies, I cannot leave out genitalia. Often
when I tell people that I am transgender, the first question I am asked is:
"Have you had THE surgery?" There is no such thing as THE surgery.
There are many different possible types of surgeries.12 Further, many
51. I personally know two FTMs who chose to become pregnant and bear and raise chil-
dren. There were enough FTMs to have an entire workshop on child bearing/rearing
at last year's FTM Conference. For workshop descriptions, see So You Want to Have
Kids? Parenting and Childbirth, FTM 2004: The Gender Odyssey (2004), at
http://www.transconference.org/programming/index.htm.
52. For a list of common surgeries, see The Harry Benjamin Int'l Gender Dysphoria Ass'n,
Standards of Care for Gender Identity Disorders, Sixth Version (Feb. 2001), at
http://www.hbigda.org/soc.cfm. For a more detailed list, see Ryan Nicholas Gorton,
M.D., Transgender Therapy: A Summary of Common Surgical, Medical, and Behavioral
Techniques to Achieve Cross-Gender Transition, Sylvia Rivera Law Project (2004) (in-
cluding mastectomy-bilateral periareolar, mastectomy and bilateral complete with
nipple and areolar reconstruction, mastectomy-scar revision, liposuction to reduce
fat in hips, thighs, buttocks, metoidioplasty, meroidioplasry with urethroplasty, ab-
dominoplasty, free flap forearm phalloplasty, abdominal pedicle flap phalloplasty,
penile erectile prosthesis implantation, scrotoplasty with insertion of testicular ex-
panders, colpectomy, colpoplasty, hysterectomy with bilateral salpingo-
oopherectomy, tracheal shave, forehead contour adjustment, malar augmentation,
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transgender people do not want any surgery whatsoever. For some, alter-
ing genitalia surgically is important. For others, it is critical to keep their
parts just the way they are." Some transgender people do want surgical
intervention, genital or otherwise, but cannot afford it, since there is
virtually no insurance coverage for transgender surgeries.54 Many trans-
gender people are excluded categorically from having health insurance55
and many are unemployed or underemployed.56
Further, some transgender people of color want surgical procedures
and/or hormones but choose to forgo those medical interventions be-
cause to date there are no studies on the effects of hormones or
transgender surgeries on people of color.57
In sum, transgender people make many different choices for their
bodies. Some of the choices are for gender reasons; the person chooses
for themselves how best to express their gender identity physically. Some
choices are for economic reasons. Some choices are because the medical
system does not have adequate data on transgender procedures,
rhinoplasty, mentoplasty, rhytidectomy, blepharoplasty, feminizing laryngoplasty,
vaginoplasty with penile inversion, colovaginoplasty, simple penile amputation, ure-
thromeatoplasry, labiaplasty, bilateral orchiectomy, augmentation mammoplasry).
53. See Interviews, supra note 37. See also FINDING THE REAL ME, supra note 4; BoRaN-
STEIN, GENDER OUTLAW, supra note 24.
54. Most insurance companies categorically exclude any procedures related to being
transgender in their provider manuals. The few exceptions are California's Medi-Care
(Medi-Cal) recipients (though there are virtually no doctors in California who per-
form transgender surgeries and take Medi-Cal) and employees of the City of San
Francisco, Dupont, Lucent, Avaya, and IBM. For a listing of Fortune 500 companies
that cover all or part of the health needs of transsexuals, see Transgender at Work, Best
Companies to Work For; Transsexual Health Benefits Registry (2001), at
http://www.tgender.net/taw/goodcomp.html. In 2000, Medi-Cal was ordered by the
Superior Court of California to halt categorical denials of medically necessary proce-
dures related to being transgender. Doe v. Bonta, No. 00CS00954 (Cal. Super. Ct.
2001). In 2001, the Board of Supervisors of San Francisco removed the rransgender
exclusions from the city health plan. Advocates for the removal or the exclusions
pointed out that the city was not providing special benefits to transgender people.
Rather, it was making sure that transgender people got the same access to health care
as everyone else. For example, non-transgender people can obtain a hysterectomy, a
mastectomy, hormone therapy-yet transgender people are often denied these same
treatments. See Mark Leno, Paying and Human Rights, S.F. CHRON., Apr. 29, 2001,
at D8. For a personal story, see Rachel Gordon, Profile: Claire Skiffingron: Changing
Times: New Health Benefits for Sex-Change Surgery Will Help One City Administrator
on journey to Life as a Woman, S.F. CHRON., May 14, 2001, at Al.
55. See supra note 14.
56. See supra notes 11, 12.
57. 1 am not aware of any such study, nor is the Transgender Civil Rights Project at the
National Gay and Lesbian Taskforce, the Sylvia Rivera Law Project, or the National
Center for Lesbian Rights.
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particularly relating to transgender people of color." Thus, to assume
that transgender people all have, want, or are able to have the same type
of body is incorrect.
4. Sexual Orientations
Gender identity is who one is. Sexual orientation is to whom one is
attracted. 59 Transgender people have all sexual orientations: some trans-
gender people are straight, some are gay, some are bisexual, and some are
queer.6° Yet, such a statement is problematic. As soon as we recognize
that there are more than two genders, the terms "homosexual," "hetero-
sexual," and "bisexual" no longer make sense. For instance, I am
someone who identifies as somewhat male, but not completely, as
mostly trans, perhaps as trannyfag. So, am I "homosexual" only if I am
attracted to others who have the exact identification that I do? Am I
heterosexual if I'm attracted to anyone who does not have my exact
identification? The terms "homo-", "hetero-", and "bi-sexual" presume a
world with only two genders.
58. I am not aware of any studies that document, for instance, how many FTM trans-
gender people choose not to have "top surgery" (chest reconstruction) because of
their expression of gender identity, versus how many FTM transgender people choose
not to have top surgery because of cost or lack of medical data. In my experience
working at the Transgender Law Center, all three types of choices are made fre-
quently.
59. A version of this statement is used in many "Transgender 101" trainings and materi-
als. See, e.g., Alexander John Goodrum, Gender Identity 101: A Transgender Primer,
at http://www.sagatucson.org/resources/genderI 01.htm (last visited Feb. 14, 2005);
Warren J. Blumenfeld, Glossary of Transgender Terms, Out Proud, at http:Il
www.outproud.org/article.glossary.html (last visited Feb. 14, 2005); Carleton Col-
lege: Gender and Sexuality Center, Vocabulary (2004), at http://webapps.acs.
carleton.edu/campus/gscllgbt/vocab.
This distinction is very useful in showing that gender identity and sexual orien-
tation are different and can be mixed and matched in any way. This is not to say that
gender identity and sexual orientation are always unrelated. Some people's recogni-
tion of their gender identity comes out of sexual experiences and out of having a
certain sexual orientation. Gender is relational; one's relations may play a part in
shaping one's gender. Seeing sexual orientation and gender identity as separate is a
cultural phenomenon. See Shannon Minter, Do Transsexuals Dream of Gay Rights?
Getting Real About Transgender Inclusion in the Gay Rights Movement, 17 N.Y.L. SCH.
J. HUM. RTS. 589, 591 (2000).
60. See, e.g., FINDING THE REAL ME, supra note 4; BEsT TRANSGENDER EROTICA (Hanne
Blank & Raven Kaldera eds., 2002); Alex Sousa & Eric Peterson, FTM on FTM,
FTM INT'L NEwsLrrER, (FTM Int'l, S.F., Cal.), June 1998, at 1, 12.
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5. Diversity of Experiences and Narratives
Transgender people have different identities, bodies, levels of fluid-
ity, sexual orientations, and ways of mixing and matching all of the
above. For instance, there is no one-to-one correlation between body
modification and identity. It is not necessarily those who take low doses
of hormones who identify as between male and female. It is not neces-
sarily those who take hormones who identify as transsexual. It is not
necessarily those who have genital surgery who identify as 100% male or
100% female.61 Some queer-identified transgender people modify their
bodies, and some do not. Some transgender people who alter their bod-
ies medically have static identities, and some do not.
There is no one way to be transgender. I want to highlight this
statement: there is no prototypical transgender experience.
In many disciplines, including law, medicine, and psychiatry, there
62
exists a narrative that one has to fit to be a "real" transgender person.
Only if one fits this narrative does one become a bona fide transgender
person, one who can receive services and legal rights.63 The narrative
goes something like this: transgender men are very masculine, played
with trucks when they were little, always have known from day one that
they were men, want to be heterosexual married men, are men trapped
in women's bodies, have hated their bodies all their lives, and most defi-
nitely want genital surgery. The same goes for transgender women,
61. See Interviews, supra note 37.
62. Most states that allow one to change one's gender marker on one's birth certificate
require surgery in order to do so. See ALA. CODE § 22-9A-19(d) (1975); ARK. CODE
ANN. § 20-18-307(d) (1987); CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 103425 (1996);
COLO. REV. STAT. § 25-2-115(4) (1997); D.C. CODE ANN. § 7-217(d) (2002) ; GA.
CODE ANN. § 31-10-23(e) (2000); HAw. REv. STAT. § 338-17.7(4) (1993); LA. REv.
STAT. ANN. § 40:62(c) (2001); MASS. GEN. LAws ch. 46, § 13(e) (2000); MIcH.
COMP. LAw § 333.2831(c) (2002); Mo. REv. STAT. 5 193.215(9) (2000); Neb. Rev.
Stat. § 71-604.1 (2002); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 26:8-40.12 (1996); N.M. STAT. ANN.
§ 24-14-25(D) (2000); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 130A-1 18(b)(4) (2003). Many cases re-
quire one to fit sexist stereotypes to count as a "real" transgender person. See cases
discussed supra Part III.C. For specific medical guidelines, see Whitney Barnes, The
Medicalization of Transgenderism, Trans-Health.com (Summer 2001), at
http://www.trans-health.com/IssIVol1/medicalize-tg.htm. Transgender women were
refused hormones because they did not go to the doctor in a skirt. Transgender men
were refused hormones because they disclosed to their doctor that they are gay. Dis-
closing to one's doctor that one is neither female nor male and obtaining hormones is
virtually impossible. Interviews, in San Francisco Bay Area, Cal. (2002).
63. Danny Kirchoff, director of Transgender Equality California at Equality California,
calls this the 'proto-tranny-narrative."
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substituting dolls for trucks. Transgender people are held to even higher
sexist standards than are non-transgender people.
Transgender people have to tell this story to their doctors to get
care, and to courts and agencies to get legal rights.6 But for many trans-
gender people this story is not true, or only partially true (as described
above). Further, there are endless ways both to arrive at being trans-
gender and to be transgender. Some transgender people feel and always
felt at home in their bodies. Some transgender people who alter their
bodies never felt trapped in their bodies. I know many transgender peo-
ple who have lived happy and productive lives before coming out as
transgender.
There are many different transgender experiences, as well as many
different ways to conceptualize those experiences. Each person has their
own narrative.
Moreover, each person has several different narratives. For instance,
I can describe my past in several ways. I can pick out pieces of my past
in such a way that my narrative fits more or less closely with the tranny-
proto-narrative. I can try to make my past be more or less continuous
and consistent. Part of me is drawn to having a narrative that fits in with
a standard, or is at least consistent. But that narrative would leave out
parts of my life.
64. See supra note 62. Since, by and large, the legal and medical communities have a
particular view of what it means to be transgender, in order to get rights and/or
medical care, transgender people, in these settings, have to conform themselves to the
expectations. I have gone to countless transgender support group meetings where
transgender people shared: "only if you say x, y, and z about yourself will this doc-
tor/clinic provide you care," or "only if you say x, y, and z about yourself will you get
a letter from the doctor that will then allow you to change the gender on your driver's
license." Since the Social Security office only recognizes male and female gender iden-
tities, I counsel people that using that setting to talk about their complex genderqueer
identity may not be the most effective.
There are exceptions. There are doctors and clinics that do not require that
transgender people fit into narrow boxes. These are doctors who provide a safe envi-
ronment in which transgender people can be themselves, openly. These are doctors
who listen to and hear transgender people, instead of imposing their own preconcep-
tions. I am very grateful to those doctors and clinics.
There are also laws that do not require a particular narrative. See, e.g., City and
County of S.F. Human Rights Comm'n, Compliance Guidelines to Prohibit Gender
Identity Discrimination (Dec. 10, 2003), at http://www.sfgov.org/site/
sfhumanrights-page.asp?id=6274 [hereinafter Compliance Guidelines]; Assem. Bill
196, 2003-2004 Reg. Sess. (Cal. 2003) (amending CA.. Gov'T CODE § 12926, add-
ing 12949); Assem. Bill 537, 1999-2000 Reg. Sess. (Cal. 1999) (amending CAL.
Enuc. CODE § 200). Years of negotiations made these laws inclusive of transgender
people who do not fit a narrow story.
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I would like to let go of the need to have a cohesive linear narrative,
and the need to have just one narrative. My life is complex. All our lives
are complex. I would like to see us use our narratives in ways that em-
power us and that allow us to freely explore, and become, ourselves. For
this to become a possibility, we have to tell and share many more narra-
tives, the complicated and the simple, and to be very careful not to reify
or institutionalize any particular one.
B. A Non-Linear View of Gender-The Gender Galaxy
Often when people get past the myth of two genders and attempt
to describe gender diversity, they paint a line and see a spectrum run-
ning from female to male.65 This article explains why the linear
conception of a line or spectrum is not adequate and offers a non-linear
conceptualization of gender.
To illustrate the limitation of a linear view of gender, here are a few
of my friends: a butch transwoman; an FTM transperson who does not
identify as male and, for that matter, is not very masculine or butch-he
likes to wear nail polish; a butch woman who was assigned female at
birth and who identifies as a woman; a woman who was assigned female
at birth and who is viewed as "high femme," but who actually identifies
as a fierce drag queen and does femininity with irony. How would my
friends be ordered on a line from female to male? Where would we put a
sissy FTM compared to a butch woman? Would the feminine FTM be
more toward the female end of the spectrum because he is more femi-
nine? Would the butch woman be more toward the female end of the
spectrum because she identifies as a woman? Where does a fierce femme
fall on this line?"6 It is impossible to order us on a line. The linear con-
ception of gender is a logical impossibility. The line falls apart.
65. Virtually every "Transgender 101" workshop I have attended has used this approach.
See also Case, supra note 27.
66. In my experience, the linear conception of gender also furthers divisions between
communities. For instance, there are at times misunderstandings and difficult rela-
tions between butch women and FTMs, which, in my experience, is in part due to a
linear conception of gender. Under a linear conception of gender, a question arises:
are butch women more masculine or are FTMs more masculine? That is, where, on
the line of gender, do we place FTMs relative to butch women? With this view of
gender, competition arises-a competition of masculinity, a competition that does
cause tensions. This competition is unnecessary. I know masculine FTMs, I know
FTMs who are not very masculine, and I know butch women who are more mascu-
line than most FTMs.
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Gender is much bigger than a line. It is at least a three-dimensional
space, but not a Cartesian one, not a space created by three lines. There
are no lines, no ordering. There is just space-an infinite space, a space
that allows motion. I have gender claustrophobia and need a big space. I
do not like it when people tell me that I have to identify as female or
In my experience, viewing gender as a line also leads to viewing gender as pro-
gressive. In other words, that butch women naturally progress into FTMs and that
FTMs were butch women at some point. From attending the butch/FTM forums, I
notice that viewing gender as progressive leads to a fear of "losing hutches" to the
FTM world. Yet, many FTMs never were butch women. I know FTMs who were
straight women, feminine women, androgynous women, and hutch women. Further,
many butch women never transition to become FTMs. Many butch women are in
fact MTFs-a "gaining of butches."
A gender galaxy conception does not lead to competition or a viewing of gender
as progressive. "Butch woman" is a different gender than "FTM"-they are not line-
arly related. They are two equally valid and different locations in the gender galaxy.
67. Eve Sedgwick proposes a model of gender that shares some similarities with the gen-
der galaxy. Sedgwick describes gender as a space created by three, four, or n number
of lines. She points our rightly that there are many independent or unpredictably re-
lated gender categories. So, for instance, one can be feminine but not femme, or
masculine but not butch. To account for the many ways in which people can be gen-
dered, Scdgwick suggests a model of gender in which each gender term has its own
axis in space. So, for instance, one's gender could be high on the masculinity axis and
low on the butch axis. Importantly, Sedgwick's model is one in which masculinity
and femininity are not linearly related to each other. The axis of femininity and the
axis of masculinity are perpendicular to each other, in other words independent. If
one is more feminine, one is not automatically less masculine. One's gender could be
high on the masculinity axis and high on the femininity axis--one's gender can be
gender-ful. Eve Kosofsky Sedgwick, "Gosh, Boy George, You Must Be Awfully Secure in
Your Masculinity!", in CONSTRUCTING MASCULINITY 1 1 (Maurice Berger et al. eds.,
1995).
Sedgwick's model and the gender galaxy overlap in that they are both at least
three-dimensional. Both models allow for infinite combinations of gender character-
istics, and both models see masculinity and femininity not in opposition, not linearly
related.
Yet Sedgwick's model, being a linear Cartesian space, differs from the gender
galaxy. The gender galaxy is a non-linear space. I prefer the non-linear model because
it does nor require that we definitively demark and make quantifiable each gender
characteristic. To create separate lines for butch, masculine, femme, high femme,
trannyfag, and so on, we have to define these terms and make them quantifiable. I do
not think it is possible to standardize definitions for all gender terms. If I ask ten
people what 'trannyfag' means to them, I suspect I will get ten different answers. I am
also resistant to making the terms quantifiable. In a linear space, people are ordered;
unless person A has exactly the same gender as person B, person A is more or less
butch than person B. Having a hierarchy of femmeness or butchness or femininity
creates a framework that can easily lead to competition and division. In the gender
galaxy, if two people are at different gender locations, it does not necessarily mean
that one is more butch or more femme than another-it means that one person is dif
ferenty butch or differently femme from another. Different genders are not linearly or
hierarchically related, different genders are simply that, different.
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male. I also do not like it when people tell me that, because it is not
radical enough, I cannot identify as female or male. 8 I need a big space
in which everyone's gender has a space, and in which our genders are
not hierarchically ordered.69 Thus, a conception that works for me is a
galaxy. A gender galaxy. 7 It is big, and it moves.
1. Each Person Has a Gender, a Place in the Gender Galaxy
One of my transgender friends gets annoyed when she is invited to
speak on every gender panel. She asks the person who is inviting her
68. The idea that the best gender to have is the most complicated one or the one that
combines the most female and male characteristics in one person replaces one norm
with another. In a world that tells us from day one who we should be and how we
should be, choosing one's own gender, whether or not exactly the gender one was as-
signed at birth, is radical.
69. Most of the United States still sees gender as binary and hierarchal. Thus, even if I see
my gender as falling somewhere in the gender galaxy, many others will read my gen-
der in a binary way and accordingly give or withhold privilege. See generally BARTEY,
supra note 38; MARILYN FRYE, POLITICS OF REALITY: ESSAYS IN FEMINIST THEORY
(1983). The United States still operates on a hierarchized gender model. I do not
want to invalidate that material reality in any way. But, one way to change that reality
is to change how we view gender. It is harder to discriminate based on gender if there
are a million non-hierarchical genders that could change at any moment. To dis-
criminate based on gender, we need fairly discrete gender categories, and the fewer,
the simpler, and the more easily recognizable the better. Having only two gender
categories ("women" and "men") makes discrimination and oppression fairly simple:
one category is seen as superior to the other, and one is given preferential treatment
over the other. In the United States, we spend an enormous amount of energy mak-
ing sure that we can tell into which of the two categories any person falls so that we
can engage in preferential treatment. See id. at 17. If it is difficult to tell into which
category a person falls or if people move from one category to another, it will be more
difficult to discriminate based on gender. It will be more difficult to know against
whom to discriminate. If we have an infinite number of categories, it is difficult to
order them hierarchically-and so to discriminate. Sexism would have a more diffi-
cult time surviving in a gender galaxy.
70. Thanks to Ellise Nicholson from whom I first heard this beautiful phrase-the gen-
der galaxy. I shared my three-dimensional, non-linear, moving view of gender, and
she said, "That's like a 'galaxy,' a 'gender galaxy.' I am not aware of anyone who has
written about gender as three-dimensional, non-linear, non-static space.
The gender galaxy has been cited in Anthony S. Winer, Assimilation, Resistance,
and Recent Transsexual Marriage Cases, I SEATTLE J. Soc. JusT. 653, 675 n.20 (2003).
For earlier short descriptions of the gender galaxy, see Joel Engardio, Legal
Precedent, S.F. WEEKLY, June 12, 2002; Dylan Vade, Beyond the Women's Room,
CURVE MAGAZINE, May 2003, at 46; Dylan Vade (with Jody Marksamer), Tram-
gender Introduction, Transgender Law Center (2003), available at http://www.
transgenderlawcenter.org/tranny/pdfs/Transgender% 2 01 01.pdf.
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why that person cannot be on the panel themselves-after all, that per-
son has a gender, too. Each person has a space in the galaxy. Each person
has a gender. Trannygrrrl/boy with drag queen tendencies is a location in
the gender galaxy. Fierce femme is a location in the gender galaxy. Girl
with a hot glue gun is a location in the gender galaxy. Female and male
are locations in the gender galaxy.7'
Gender is one's own specific way of interacting with and presenting
oneself to the world. Gender is expression-physical, mental, spiritual,
sexual, inter-relational, connective expression. Gender is how we relate
to each other and to the world. Gender is how we move through the
world. Gender is a sense of self and a relationship to the world.72 One's
sense of self is organic and inter-relational. Gender is that expressive,
relational, embodied selfE7
And we all have a gender. None of us can be anything but ourselves
or have a gender other than our own. 7' Gender is complex. There are
many different gender expressions. Ideally, each of our genders is our
own as defined by ourselves."5
71. Female and male, though parts of the gender galaxy, take on a different meaning in
that context. In the context of the binary gender system, female and male are all that
exist and the ultimate norms. In the context of the gender galaxy, they are two among
an infinite number of genders.
72. Transgender people, as everyone, "are not simply expressing their innermost sense of
self, but are re-establishing their relationship to the world." Ken Cooper, Practice
with Transgendered Youth and Their Families, in SOCIAL SERVICES WITH4 TRANS-
GENDER YotrH 111, 113 (Gerald P. Mallon ed., Harrington Park Press 1999).
73. For example, Judith Butler views gender as performative-a performativity that is
expressive, physical, and done in relation to others. See, e.g., JUDITH BUTLER, GENDER
TROUBLE: FEMINISM AND THE SUBVERSION OF IDENTITY (1990); Judith Butler, Imita-
tion and Gender Insubordination, in INSIDE/OUT: LESBIAN THEORIES, GAY THEORIES
(Diana Fuss ed., 1991).
74. Though we cannot be other than ourselves or have a gender other than our own, we
can present to the world a gender that is nor our own and not defined by ourselves.
From hearing transgender people speak about their experiences and from personal
experience, presenting a gender to the world that is not one's own takes enormous
energy, is exhausting, and keeps one from being fully, openly, and honestly present to
other people and to the world (and to oneself).
75. Currently, many people are not able to express themselves as they would like, due to
sexism, transphobia, racism, our economic structure, and the very justified fear of los-
ing one's job, losing one's family, being assaulted, and losing one's life. We do not yet
live in a world where we can all express our genders freely and be ourselves. For ex-
amples of difficulties that transgender people face in expressing their gender
identities, see supra notes 9-16 and accompanying text.
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2. The Multiplicity in the Gender Galaxy Is Not a Void
I recently saw a postcard by Mollie Biewald from 1999 that said
"things you can do to eradicate gender or to multiply it exponentially'
followed by many trans-positive suggestions. Also, I often hear and read
suggestions that all of gender is bad and we should just get rid of gender
altogether--or that not having a gender is the best gender to have. Gen-
der is seen as that which allows sexism and restrictive gender norms to
exist. Gender is seen as a hindrance without which there would be no
gender oppression. 76 I often hear that the ideal world would be one in
which gender does not matter, in which everyone is seen simply as
themselves, is seen simply as a human being, a gender-less human be-
ing-a gender-blind world.
Sometimes, the gender galaxy with its infinite genders is conflated
with having no genders and with being gender-blind. I want to be clear
that this is not what I mean.
First, I do not think that it is possible to have a world without gen-
der. What would that world look like? Does that mean that we are all
androgynous? Androgynous is a gender, a specific location in the galaxy.
By saying that we want to eradicate gender, are we really replacing one
norm with another?
Second, I like my gender. I am rather attached to my tranny gen-
der. It took me thirty-four years to get here. I like gendered people.
Gender can be playful and fun. Gender is part of who we are. I do not
want to rid myself of my gender; I want to reclaim it.
Third, I cannot erase how my gender is perceived by others and the
ramifications of those perceptions. Gender-blind politics is harmful to
those who are most discriminated against because of gender norms.
Right now, we have sexism. Right now, we have transphobia. Right now,
though we are all harmed by gender norms, some of us are harmed more
than others. To move toward a world in which sexism and transphobia
do not exist, we have to address issues that affect women and trans-
gender people. If we act as if gender does not exist, then we act as if
76. See, e.g., Ria ANNE WILCHINs, READ My Lips: SEXUAL SUBVERSION AND THE END
or GENDER 16 (1997) ("1 have begun speaking simply of gender as a name for that
system that punishes bodies for how they look."). Gender is all bad. Gender only
punishes. Gender is a cage. Id. at 156. I do agree that the way we currently conceptu-
alize and use gender is highly problematic: that there are only two options, that no
one can choose their option, that there are hierarchies of power related to gender.
Gender in and of itself, however, is not bad.
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sexism and transphobia do not exist and so reinforce the privilege of
gender-normal genders and, in particular, male genders. 7
Again, I propose a gender galaxy, a space with many genders, not no
genders. The gender galaxy is a space with infinite gender options that
can move and are not hierarchically related-a space in which each of us
has a location, a space in which each of us can choose that location and
where all locations are equally supported and respected.
The gender galaxy already exists. There are infinite genders, and
they are not linearly related. The people I see every day exist. Our gen-
ders exist. We exist. The gender galaxy already exists. But, we do still have
to work toward a world in which everyone can freely choose their
location in the gender galaxy. We do still have to work toward a world in
which all people and all gender locations are supported, recognized, and
protected by the law, without threat of harm, and, ideally, celebrated.
II. AGAINST THE USE OF THE SEX-GENDER DISTINCTION: IT Is NOT
LOGICAL AND IT Is HARMFUL TO TRANSGENDER PEOPLE
A. De-Naturalizing Sex: Sex Is Not to Nature as Gender Is to Culture-
Both Sex and Gender Are Social Constructs and Socially Real
Often when I describe the beautifil gender variety of the trans-
gender communities, the response is "well, that's gender, we all know
that gender is cultural and varying-but, who are you kidding, all of
you still have a predetermined sex." Sex is natural and biological and
medically objective and fixed. Gender is cultural and changeable and
subjective and in the head. Transgender people are those whose sex and
gender do not match. I strongly disagree with this conceptualization.
77. For a criticism of race-blind politics, see Gary Peller, Race Consciousness, 1990 DuKE
L.J. 758 (1990). Though I am not implying that race and gender are the same, I
would argue similarly against a gender-blind society as Peller argues against a race-
blind society.
78. Feminists who argue for the use of the sex-gender distinction view sex as related to
biology and gender as related to culture-sex related to male and female, and gender
related to masculine and feminine. See Case supra note 27, at 11; Valdes, supra note
28, at 21. This conceptualization of sex and gender, female and feminine, male and
masculine, does have a positive effect. By separating female from feminine and male
from masculine, we can envision masculine females and feminine males. We can en-
vision non-stereotypical women and men.
I find it crucial to create space for feminine men and masculine women. The
sex-gender distinction, however, is not necessary to achieve that space and possibility.
Other conceptualizations create space for masculine women and for feminine men.
And the sex-gender distinction has the negative by-product of reinforcing sexism and
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The separation of gender from sex is a separation of expression
from biology, of culture from nature, of emotion from reason, and of
subjectivity from objectivity. These are false distinctions, and they are
not helpful if we are looking for a world that protects and celebrates dif-
ference."
My theoretical leanings aside, I will look at the case at hand. What
is sex in the United States? How does sex get determined in the United
States?
There is an entire social apparatus whose sole purpose is to de-
termine, track, and maintain my sex ... in the face of which
none of us has a choice.8°
ultimately reinforcing and ossifying rigid gender norms. Katherine Franke poignantly
shows how the sex-gender distinction keeps in place the validity of biological differ-
ences and the hierarchies of power based on those biological differences: the sex-
gender split is "a central mistake of equality jurisprudence ... [an] equality jurispru-
dence [that] has uncritically accepted the validity of biological sexual differences."
Franke, supra note 29, at 2.
79. For more discussion on this point, particularly the emotion/reason and related
body/mind split, see Carol Bigwood, Renaturalizing the Body (with the Help of Mer-
leau-Ponty), 6 HYPAT-iA 54 (1991) (arguing that all knowledge comes from or through
our bodies); Rost BRAIDOTri, PATTERNS OF DISSONANCE: A STUDY OF WOMEN IN
CONTEMPORARY PHILOSOPHY (Elizabeth Guild trans., Polity Press, 1991) (calling for
a more embodied thought); LORRAINE CODE, EPISTEMIc RESPONSIBILITY (1987) (ar-
guing that knowledge arose more out of particulars than universals); Vrinda Dalmiya
& Linda Alcoff, Are "Old Wives'" Tales Justifed?, in FEMINIST EPISTEMOLOGIES 217
(Linda Alcoff & Elizabeth Potter eds., 1993) (questioning the validity of seeing
"more scientific" views, that is, views more aligned with "reason," as more valid);
FRYE, supra note 69, at 84 (showing how knowledge can come from emotion);
PATRICIA S. GREENSPAN, EMOTIONS AND REASONS: AN INQUIRY INTO EMOTIONAL
JUSTIFICATION (1988) (showing the importance of emotion in knowledge and rea-
son); Lisa Heldke, Recipes for Theory Making, 3 HYPATiA 15 (1988) (showing that
theorizing, usually seen as reason, includes emotion, intuition, and particulars); Al-
ison M. Jaggar, Love and Knowledge: Emotion in Feminist Epistemology, in WOMEN,
KNOWLEDGE, AND REALITY: EXPLORATIONS IN FEMINIST PHILOSOPHY 129 (Ann
Garry & Marilyn Pearsall eds., Unwin Hyman 1989) (showing how our perceptions
are inextricably intertwined with our emotions); GENEVIEVE LLOYD, THE MAN OF
REASON: "MALE" AND "FEMALE" IN WESTERN PHILOSOPHY (2d ed. 1984) (describing
how historically "female" has been defined in opposition to "reason"); Evelyn Fox
Keller, Feminim and Science in WOMEN, KNOWLEDGE, AND REALrTY, supra, at 175
(describing the importance of intuition and the body in reason); Phyllis Rooney, Re-
cent Work in Feminist Discussions of Reason, 31 AMERICAN PHILOSOPHICAL
QUARTERLY 1 (1994) (describing the different forms that women are seen as or that
are excluded from reason); Gail Stenstad, Anarchic Thinking, 3 HYPATIA 87 (1988)
(showing the value of ambiguity and incompleteness in forming knowledge).
80. WILCHINS, supra note 76, at 57.
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Human beings come in a great biological variety. Julie Greenberg
lists several of the biological criteria we usually associate with sex: genet-
ics/chromosomes, gonads, internal reproductive morphology, external
reproductive morphology, hormones, and phenology/secondary sex fea-812
tures.' Within each category alone there are many possibilities. 2
Further, there are endless combinations between these categories."
There is an amazing biological variety.8' Where we draw lines, and on
what we focus, are cultural choices.
81. Greenberg, supra note 26, at 278.
82. For instance, in chromosomes, one can have not only xy or xx, but also xxx, xxy,
xxxy, xyy, xyyy, xyyyy, or xo. One can have two ovaries, two testes, one ovary and
one testis, two ovotestes, or streak testes which function as neither One's external
morphology can consist of a small dli, a large clit, a small penis, a large penis, both a
penis and a vagina. One can have different combinations of internal morphology.
Everyone has both testosterone and estrogen and there are endless combinations of
relative amounts. Similarly there are endless combinations of phenotypical features
(e.g. hair, breasts, etc.). Id. at 278-91. For frequency of particular physical condi-
tions, see Melanie Blackless et al., How Sexually Dimorphic Are We? Review and
Synthesis, 12 Am. J. HuM. BIOLOGY 151 (2000), available at http://www3.
interscience.wiley.com/cgi-bin/fulltext/69504033/PDFSTART.
83. For instance, one can have an xy chromosome and a testes and external female genita-
lia. Greenberg, supra note 26, at 273.
84. I am not describing the enormous biological variety to naturalize transgender, to say
that there is a natural basis for transgender experience. It is not those people whose
genitalia fall into the intersex category that identify as third gender. Most intersex
people identify as male or female. Some identify as transgender. Most transgender
people were not labeled intersex at birth. See EMI KOyAMA, INTRODUCTION TO INTER-
SEX ACTivisM: A GUIDE FOR GAY, LESBIAN, BISEXUAL, AND TRANS ALLIES (Intersex
Society of North America 2001). Gender identification has nothing to do with geni-
tal configuration.
Collapsing transgender and intersex hides the fact that the experience of intersex
and transgender people is quite different. Though the underlying gender system
makes life difficult for both intersex and transgender people (and some people are
both intersex and transgender) it does so in very different ways. Intersex people are
fighting the medical establishment to stop unconsented infant genital mutilation.
Transgender people are fighting to have their genders recognized and legally pro-
tected.
Naturalizing transgender also denigrates choice. Only those whose genitalia are
intersex would be "true" transgender people. Naturalizing transgender furthers the
belief that there is validity and truth in tying gender to genitalia.
I am not describing the enormous biological variety to naturalize the gender of
transgender people or to show that gender is just as natural as sex. On the contrary, I
am describing the enormous biological variety to denaturalize sex, to show that sex,just as gender, is a cultural construct-and an extremely harmful construct.
For background material on intersex people, see Intersex Society of North
America (ISNA) website at http://www.isna.org. See also SUZANNE J. KESSLER, LEs-
SONS FROM THE INTERSEXD (1998); Greenberg, supra note 26; Alice Domurat
Dreger, "Ambiguous Sex"-or Ambivalent Medicine? THE HASTINGS CENTER REPORT
24 (May/June 1998); Brief of Amicus Curiae Intersex Society of North America,
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According to Julie Greenberg, one's ability to participate in repro-
ductive heterosexual intercourse is key in how we draw that line, in
determining one's birth-assigned gender."' Some courts use this stan-
dard,86 although it is a difficult standard to apply practically. It is
difficult to know whether or not and how a five-minute old baby will be
a heterosexually reproductive adult.8 7 We need a test for heteronormativ-
ity that works for five-minute old babies. This is our test:
heteronormativity is measured with a ruler." The baby's genitalia are
measured by a ruler, and different doctors use different rulers." If the
clitoris/penis is below a certain length, it is a clitoris and the child a girl;
if the clitoris/penis it is above a certain length, it is a penis and the child
a boy. If the clitoris/penis falls between the two marks, the child is called
intersex, a medical and social emergency.' ° This emergency must be "cor-
rected" immediately, "corrected" with a knife,9 for the child's own good.92
Intersex Genital Surgery Cases, Const. Court of Colum., Sentencia SU-337/99
(1999), at http://lwww.isna.orglnode/97; S.F. Human Rights Comm'n Hearing,
May 27, 2004, at http://www.sfgov.orgisite/sfhumanrights-page.asp?id=2 4 950.
85. Greenberg, supra note 26, at 272.
86. See, e.g., MT. v. JT, 355 A.2d 204, 209-10 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1976);
Frances B. v. Mark B., 355 N.Y.S.2d 712, 717 (N.Y. 1974).
87. See Dreger, supra note 84, at 26.
88. Some doctors define penises as being 1 cm and above, some define them as 1.5 cm
and above, some 2.5 cm and above. Dreger, supra note 84, at 26. See Jody Lynee
Madeira, Law as a Reflection of Her/His-Story: Current Institutional Perceptions of and
Possibilities for, Protecting Transsexuals' Interests in Legal Determinations of Sex, 5 U.
PA. J. CONST. L. 128, 132-36 (2002) (discussing the construction of the body and
viewing the body as text).
89. See supra note 88.
90. There is limited agreement on how many people are intersex. First, it is difficult to
get an exact number because there is a lot of shame around being intersex, so many
intersex people do not disclose that they are intersex. Greenberg, supra note 26, at
268 n.9.
Further, one's answer depends on how one defines intersex (and how one de-
fines man and woman). According to Julie Greenberg, the numbers are between 1 in
25 and 1 in 100. Id. at 267. According to ISNA, intersex births are statistically any-
where from 1 in 1500 to 1 in 2000. INTERSEX Soc'Y OF N. Am., How Common Is
Intersex, at http://www.isna.org/faq/frequency (last visited Apr. 5, 2005). The statis-
tics are 1.7/1000 according to Ken Cooper. Cooper, supra note 72, at 115. Even if
we take a conservative figure, such as 1 in 2000-this means that there are more in-
tersex people in the world than there are Jewish people. SHERRI GROvEMAN,
INTRODUCTION TO INTERSEX ACTIVISM (Intersex Soc'y N. Am. 2001).
Why is there so little agreement? To know who is intersex, who has ambiguous
genitalia, we have to know what we consider to be ambiguous. To know who falls
outside or between female or male, we have to know what is female and what is male.
To know what is a mixture of essential female and essentially male characteristics, we
have to know what the essential male and essentially female characteristics are. How
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The categories of intersex, female, and male are not natural. If we use
a certain ruler, all intersex people would be 'cured' on the spot. If we use a
different ruler, all of us would be intersex. Sex is just as much a cultural
construct as is gender.94 Both sex and gender are socially constructed and
socially real. The logic of 'sex is to nature as gender is to culture' does not
hold. Sex is not the natural biological true backdrop for a cultural gen-
der.95
we define inrersex depends on how we define male and female, and vice versa. This is
circular reasoning. Intersex, female, and male are not natural categories. Dreger, supra
note 84, at 26.
91. In the United States, each day, five infants are subjected to unconsented genital sur-
gery. Cheryl Chase, Address at Creating Change, Annual Conference of the Gay and
Lesbian Task Force (Nov. 2001). For more information on the prevalence of per-
forming surgery on infant's genitalia, see Greenberg, supra note 26, at 271.
92. S.F. Human Rights Comm'n Hearing, May 27, 2004, at http://www.sfgov.org/sitel
sfhumanrights.page.asp?id=24950; Pediatric Assignment of Sex: A Critical Reappraisal
(Stephen A. Zderic et al. eds., 2002).
One rationale behind infant mutilation is that without this surgical interven-
tion, the child will be mercilessly harassed at school, in lockerrooms, etc. At a recent
panel discussion, one intersex person who did not have unconsented surgical inter-
vention at birth (her parents are doctors and successfully argued with the doctors who
did want to mutilate their child) discussed her experience in locker rooms. She said
that she had no difficulties. First, the other children did not pay that much attention
to her or anyone else's genitalia. Further, she did not have self doubt: she thought
that the other children's genitalia were unusual, not her own. Intersex Panel, Intersex
Society of Notth America, in San Francisco, Cal. (July 2001).
93. This example is Cheryl Chase's. Chase, supra note at 91.
94. By calling sex a cultural construct I do not intend to minimize how this construct
affects all of us every day. The construct sex creates a cultural reality, and its norma-
tive affects are all too real. Those who are seen as intersex are mutilated at birth in the
name of this construct to keep alive the cultural belief that there are only two natural
sexes. Those who are so lucky as to not get labeled intersex at birth are still labeled
boy or girl, a label that will affect what color shirt one will wear on day one, the types
of socks/hose one will wear at job interviews, to what jobs one will have easy access,
how one will perceive and live and move in one's body, what emotions one can ac-
ceptably express, whether one's assertiveness will be seen as aggressive, the level of
safety one feels walking alone at night, what bathroom one will go to, how one is
treated by teachers, strangers, parents, how one is expected to interact, and so on.
Sex-the label one gets at birth, without one's consent, based on a quick measure-
ment of one body part-is a label that will affect every single aspect of every day of
one's life. Sex is a cultural construct that creates our social reality. The construct of
sex sets in motion and justifies an enormous cultural apparatus that throws all human
beings into one of two tracks. And this cultural construct is made to appear natural-
so as to seem unquestionable and inevitable. For a discussion on the apparatus that
maintains and reinforces our sex, see, for example, FRY, supra note 69, and BAitascr,
supra note 38.
95. Judith Butler was the first to unpack this relation between sex and gender-i.e., that
sex is seen as the natural, objective grounding for a cultural gender. Seeing sex as
natural and objective justifies the existence of gender norms. See supra note 73.
282 [Vol. 11:253
EXPANDING GENDER AND EXPANDING THE LAW
In addition to being illogical, the sex-gender distinction leads to an
arbitrary cutting up of the body, leads us to make arbitrary distinctions
between aspects and parts of our bodies. As just discussed, genital size at
birth is absolute truth-and so it is definitely "sex.",96 Genital size later in
life is somewhat related to truth-somewhat sex. Voice, body build, hor-
mones, hair growth are half truths-part sex, part gender. How one
moves, feels, talks, interacts does not matter-it is only gender.17 All the
above are of the body; they are physical as well as social. There is no logi-
cal reason to say that any one of the above is "more" physical/natural/
bodily than another. Genitalia are no more physical than one's shoulders
or one's hormones. One's tattoo is no less physical than one's body hair.
What counts and what does not is an arbitrary choice. An arbitrary deci-
sion about what parts of our bodies count and what parts do not that
constructs a hierarchy.
Granted, there are some theories that posit that distinctions in geni-
tal size and shape are meaningful and should be used in creating social
categories. For instance, some theorists believe that the differentiation
between women and men may stem out of a differentiated role in repro-
duction, which is tied to genitalia." My point is that we could make a
million differentiations: we could have gender difference based on height,
we could have gender difference based on whether or not someone can
roll their tongue, we could have gender difference based on inny or outy
96. Genitalia are "absolute truth." See discussion supra Part II.A. This belief is also not
foreign to the law. For instance, many states require genital surgery to change the
gender marker on one's identification. For state laws on birth certificate gender
changes, see supra note 62. Phil Duran of OutFront Minnesota had an excellent re-
sponse regarding Minnesota's requirement of genital surgery to change the gender
marker on one's driver's license. He asked Minnesota Driver and Vehicle Services
(DVS) why it put a picture of people's faces and not of people's genitalia on the
driver's license if genitalia are so critical:
"DVS' policy requiring amended birth records effectively requires that
those seeking to change their driver's licenses undergo genital reconstruc-
tion. However, DVS has no legitimate interest in the shape of license
applicants' genital organs. DVS does not ask about applicants' genitals, and
the shape of one's genitals has no bearing, of course, on one's ability to
drive. As part of its efforts to confirm a physical description of an appli-
cant, DVS photographs the applicant's face, not their genitals."
Phil Duran, OutFront Minnesota, Petition for Rulemaking to Minnesota Department
of Public Safety (2002).
97. It is very rare that self-identification is recognized in the law; the law ordinarily re-
quires some form of medical intervention to "validate" the person's gender identity.
See supra note 5. For a good exception, see Compliance Guidelines, supra note 64.
98. See, e.g., Sherry Ortmer, Is Female to Male as Nature Is to Culture?, in WOMEN AND
VALuEs: READINGS IN RECENT FEMINIsT PHILOSOPHY (Marilyn Pearsall ed., 1986).
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belly buttons, we could have gender difference based on how well a per-
son can cook.
And, if we are going to b.se gender on role in reproduction and form
of genitalia, then to be consistent, are those people with wombs that are
infertile not women? Are those people in menopause no longer women?
Does a hysterectomy change one's gender? Are impotent men not men?
Are men with small penises not men? Having an enormous social category
that affects every second of one's life based on one's assumed role in re-
production or one part of one's body is excessive and arbitrary.99
Giving such enormous import to assumed genitalia is an arbitrary
cultural choice. It is a choice that is linked to and supported by the sex-
gender distinction. The sex-gender distinction is not logical, and it creates
arbitrary distinctions in our embodied existence. This is not its only harm.
B. The Sex-Gender Distinction Takes the Power to Se/f-Define
from Transgender People and Hands It to
Non- Transgender People and the
Medical Establishment
If the sex-gender distinction is illogical and arbitrary, why do we
hold onto it? I suspect it is because the use of this distinction sets up a
social reality that gives power to some and takes power from others.
What are the systems of power that the sex-gender distinction sup-
ports? " What is at stake?l
t0
99. Further, in most of life, actual genitalia do not matter. In our day to day life, we do
not read the gender of our co-workers, our friends, or the people we pass on the street
by looking at their actual genitalia. We read gender and then assume genitalia. Have
you seen every person's genitalia whose gender you know? Thanks to Jody Mark-
samer for this observation.
100. Whenever there is a conceptualization, such as the sex-gender distinction, that aids a
power differential (by making it seem natural, for instance), questions arise. Who
benefits from that conceptualization? And, what keeps that conceptualization and
power differential in place? See, e.g., FRIEDRICH NIETZSCHE, BEYOND GOOD AND
EviL: A PRELUDE TO A PHILOSOPHY OF THE FUTURE (Walter Kaufman trans., 1989);
MIc HEL FOUCAULT, THE HISTORY OF SExuALITY: AN INTRODUCTION (Robert Hurley
trans., 1990).
101. Who benefits from a world of binary, genitally based, unquestioned gender? Cer-
tainly, people who do not have binary or genitally based genders-or who question
gender--do not benefit. See supra notes 9-16 and accompanying text. People who
present according to traditional gender norms have a relative benefit. Men do benefit.
Sexism and the preferential allocation of resources to men can exist more easily if
there are few and easily recognizable genders that cannot be questioned. See, e.g.,
Frye, supra note 69, at 1-40 (describing how easily recognizeable genders aid the op-
pression of women).
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By calling doctor-assigned gender by a different name, by calling it
"sex" and by calling it by a name that we (incorrectly) associate with na-
ture and objectivity, we give doctors power. Doctors' gender
assignments, although subjective assignments done by human beings,
are relegated to a different truth realm than any other gender assign-
ments. The sex-gender distinction sets up doctor-assigned gender (called
'sex') as Truth, with a capital "T." It gives doctors omnipotent power to
define and to decide gender, making their choices unquestioned and
sacred. Thus, the sex-gender distinction provides the backdrop that gives
doctors the right to perform unconsented mutilation on people whom
the doctors call intersex in order to fit that truth."2 It makes a trans-
gender person's self-assignment of gender false, as hiding the truth, or at
best, something unrelated to the truth. The sex-gender distinction keeps
transgender people's self-identity from being recognized as valid by
courts, by doctors, by people in general. The sex-gender distinction ap-
pears in many forms. It commonly appears in definitions of transgender
people. Transgender people often are defined as "having a mismatch of
gender and sex."' 3 Following the logic of truth, we can rewrite this as:
"transgender people are really objectively and naturally of sex x but think
they are and pretend to be of gender y." Within this truth, transgender
102. Consent: obviously a one day old child cannot consent, but parents can. This consent
can be meaningful if the parents are educated on intersex issues, as presented by inter-
sex organizations, rather than as presented by the medical establishment, before
making that decision. Doctors should provide information on real medical issues and
dangers that might arise if the child undergoes surgery. Doctors should show video-
tapes provided by ISNA. Telling parents that the child must undergo surgery to lead
a productive happy life is a misrepresentation and does not leave parents with a
meaningful, informed ability to choose. And if there is no true medical emergency,
there is always the option of letting the child decide themselves when they are older.
See Kishka-Kamari Ford, "First, Do No Harm "-The Fiction ofLegal Parental Consent
to Genital-Normalizing Surger7 on Intersexed Infants, 19 Yale L. & Pol'y Rev. 469,
474 (2001) (arguing that parents are not given enough information by doctors to give
legal consent to their child's surgery); Glenn M. Burton, General Discussion of Legal
Issues Affecting Sexual Assignment of Intersex Infants Born with Ambiguous Genitalia, at
http://www.isna.org/node/196 (last visited Apr. 29, 2005).
103. 1 dislike all versions of this definition: "Transmen have female bodies and male iden-
tifications," "Transwomen are male born people who feel they are women,"
"Transpeople have genitalia of one sex and the mind of another," "FTMs are women
with body ambivalence who cut off their tits and "turn into men." Michelle Tea,
Boogie Dykes, S.F. BAY GUARDIAN, Jan. 31, 2001, at 26. See also all cases cited in Part
11I.C.
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people cannot self-define. The doctor is right; transgender people are
104
wrong.
Unfortunately, these definitions of transgender people are common
and prevail in a large part of our society's consciousness." 5 A personal
example: I am a female to male transgender person who has been on
testosterone for a couple of years and looks male. I identify as trans, not
male, though in the male region of the galaxy. Often when I tell some-
one that I am transgender, that person then starts seeing me as a girl-
an odd girl, a girl who has mutilated herself, a girl who wants to be a
boy, a girl always and forever. The doctor was right. I am wrong. The
doctor names my essence. The best I can do is name the trimmings.
Why can we not question sex, the natural objective and eternal truth?
We can question the teacher who told me I could not do math. We can
question the career counselor who told me to wear a skirt. We can ques-
tion the coach who told me I could not do martial arts. We can question
doctors who do breast cancer research exclusively on men. But, ques-
tioning the doctor who told me I am a girl is off limits. Why do doctors
get to define what it means to be a man or a woman? Why do non-
transgender people get to define transgender people?0 6
The sex-gender distinction furthers a disparity in power: the doctor
has the power, the transgender person does not. I expect that therein lies
one reason for the continued use of the sex-gender distinction.
1 7
104. James Green puts it well: when we separate sex from gender, expression from biology,
"[w]hen we use terms like sex 'roles' or gender 'roles,' our language subtly conditions
us to doubt the authenticity of a person's self-expression." D.E. Butler (original draft
by Jamison Green), Training and Information Bulletin, Jan. 15, 2000, available by
contacting www.jamisongreen.com.
105. See, e.g., Wendy Melillo, D.C. Fire Officials to Reinvestigate Transvestite's Death,
WASH. POST, Dec. 5, 1995, at B2 (referring to Tyra Hunter, who was a transsexual
woman, as a man who is a transvestite, using Tyra's old name and male pronouns.
Implied in the piece is that Tyra is really a man, that Tyra is not who Tyra says she
is.). After the recent murder of the transgender woman Gwen Araujo, the local papers
and A.P. Press initially referred to Gwen as "Eddie" and used the male pronouns to
such an extent that the Gay and Lesbian Alliance Against Defamation (GLAAD) is-
sued an Action Alert. GLAAD, Urge Respectful, Accurate Coverage of Gwen Araujo
(Nov. 19, 2002), at http://www.glaad.org/action/alerts detail.php?id=3110. See also
Tea, supra note 103 (FTMs are really women who cut off their breasts). Also, please
see all cases cited in Part III.C for similar definitions.
106. See generally WtLCHINS, supra note 46.
107. I am not suggesting a conspiracy theory, that there is a group of people who conspire
to give power to doctors. Yet, individuals and groups can create, reinforce, or main-
tain power dynamics. For instance, The Harry Benjamin International Gender
Dysphoria Association (HBIGDA) creates the 'Standards of Care'-for doctors'
treatment of rransgender people. The 'Standards of Care' outline who is deemed a
real transgender person and who is not, who gets care and who does not. The Stan-
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I am concerned about doctors having the power to define a person's
gender. Gender should be self-determined, period. Telling someone that
they cannot be their self-identified gender is like telling that person they
cannot be themselves. No one can be other than who they are. The
court in Doe v. Yunits't 8 points this out well by saying that asking a
transgender woman to be male is like asking a short person to be tall.
Though I do not want the medical establishment to have power over
transgender people, I do not want the transgender movement to disen-
gage from the medical establishment. Many transgender people want
and need medical intervention. Many transgender people, in order to be
themselves, depend on sympathetic and kind doctors. Those transgender
people who do want medical intervention (hormones, surgery or multi-
ple surgeries) 09 do require medical care, and thus require doctors who
are willing and able to treat transgender people. I have had some ex-
traordinarily positive experiences with doctors who have listened to me
and provided me with respectful and individualized care. I appreciate
those doctors and clinics, the medical care I received, and that the
doctors did not try to tell me who I am. I do not object to the medical
system. I object when a person's gender is defined by someone other
than the person themselves.
The sex-gender distinction creates an environment that denigrates
gender self-identification. It is a tool for giving power to some and
taking power from others. It is a ruse for validating some experiences
over others, for linking some experiences to a purported objectivity, and
for giving certain professions eminent domain.
C. The Sex-Gender Distinction Reinforces an Environment that Places
Transgender People in Physical Danger
The sex-gender distinction also reinforces a conceptual framework
that is used to justify violence against transgender people. As described
above, the sex-gender distinction sets up the doctor-assigned gender as
truth, and the transgender person's self-identified gender as something
solely in that person's head. The belief that transgender people are frauds
dards give doctors the power to make that determination. The Standards, though
evolving, are still largely binary. And, HBIGDA board members, who create the
Standards, are largely non-transgender physicians. These individual physicians do
have enormous power and reinforce the power that physicians have over transgender
people. See The Hany Benjamin Int'l Gender Dysphoria As'n, supra note 52.
108. Doe v. Yunits, 15 Mass. L. Rep. 278, 282 (Mass. Super. Ct. Feb. 26, 2001).
109. See discussion supra Part I.A.3.
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against truth, or people who deceive others, permeates our society. This
belief places transgender people in physical danger.
One not uncommon example: Gwen Araujo was killed by her
classmates because they were transphobic, because they assumed that all
women are alike and that there is a truth to doctor assigned birth."'
They had such a hard time parting with their false beliefs that they had
to destroy any evidence to the contrary. They murdered Gwen. Gwen's
murderers are not alone in their transphobia. One article went so far as
to attempt to justify the murderer's actions by saying that Gwen raped
the murderers by deceiving them, by going against the "truth" of "sex:"
Jose Merel and friend Michael Magidson, 22, of Fremont,
Calif., had sex with Gwen that night at the party, according to
an article in The Los Angeles Times titled "Trying to
Understand Eddie's Life-and Death." The two later found
out that Gwen wasn't really Gwen at all, but rather Eddie
Araujo, a 17-year-old male from Newark. Araujo didn't tell the
men his gender. He tricked them into having sex with him,
but if they would have known his sex, they wouldn't have been
interested. That is just as bad as rape.11 '
Unfortunately, transphobia is alive and well. An average of one
transgender person a month is murdered because of transphobia. " 2
Transphobia is supported by a belief that doctor-assigned gender is truth
and that the self-identified genders of transpeople are not truthbut
fraud, deception.
To add insult to injury, much of the resulting media coverage of
Gwen's murder referred to Gwen as "he," implying that she was not who
she said she was. Again, there is the charge of deception. The use of in-
correct pronouns also arises out of and reinforces the sex-gender
distinction. By using incorrect pronouns, the media perpetuates the
myth that birth-assigned gender is truth and that transgender people are
lying, reinforcing the culture that endangers lives. 3 I want to thank
110. See, e.g., Lee supra note 7, at BI.
111. Zach Calef, Double Standards in Reactions to Rape, Iowa State Daily, Online Ed.,
Oct. 24, 2002, at http://www.iowastatedaily.com/vnews/display.v/ART/2002/10/24/
3db7765f45381 ?inarchive= 1.
112. See Smith & St. Pierre, supra note 8.
113. See supra note 32. Questioning transgender people's validity and the validity of trans-
gender people's self-identified genders is not uncommon, and occurs even in law
review articles. For instance, Ronald Garet, in his article, asks the question of how the
lives and actions of transgender people should be regarded morally. For instance, is it
moral for a father to transition? See Garet, supra note 5, at 143-45. It is interesting
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those papers who, after discussions with the transgender communities,
changed their editorial policies and started addressing transgender peo-
ple respectfully and correctly."'
D. The Sex-Gender Split Assumes Transgender People Are Not Whole, Cuts
Bodies offfrom Minds, and Cuts Bodies into Pieces
In addition to setting up sex as truth and giving doctors omnipo-
tent power to define and to declare gender, the sex-gender distinction
create in transgender people a mind-body split. In the sex-gender con-
ceptual framework, I have a female sex and a male gender; in other
words, I am a female bodied, male-identified person. Female body, male
head. This makes my head spin, literally makes me nauseated. This con-
ceptualization is self-alienating."' I am transgender, all of me is
that Garet never asks himself whether or not it is moral for him to be himself, to have
the gender he has, to make the gender choices he makes. Because his gender choices
are more in line with his birth-assigned gender, i.e. "truth," he sees himself as im-
mune from these questions. It is only transgender people who are potential frauds
and immoral agents. I find the question of whether or not it is moral for transgender
people to be themselves extraordinarily insulting. I also question Garet's familiarity
with actual transgender people. He posits that perhaps transgender are only trans-
gender because they have narrow views of gender. For instance, he suggests that
perhaps transgender women transition because they believe in sexist gender norms,
because they cannot conceive of themselves as feminine men. Jd. at 182-84. How
does this question apply to a butch lesbian transgender woman? To a not-masculine
transgender man? To a feminine transwoman? Being a feminine woman is a very dif-
ferent gender location than being a feminine man. Garet's hypothesis relies on a
limited knowledge of the transgender communities and a limited view of gender pos-
sibilities.
114. A word on disclosure of doctor-assigned gender. I am openly transgender, but, I do
not always wear it on my forehead. Sometimes I run into situations where people tell
me that I should have told them earlier that I am transgender, and that by not doing
so, I deceived them. Deception. Why do I have any more obligation to make that
disclosure than a non-transgender person? One person with whom I was flirting told
me that he was horrified because he thought that I was just a "cute gay guy." In retro-
spect, I should have responded by saying that I, too, was horrified, for I had assumed
he was "just a cute queer tranny boy," and how dare he not disclose his non-trans
status right up front. Why is the onus only on transgender people to disclose their
birth-assigned gender? I am not a fraud. I am more true to myself than I have ever
been. If someone else assumes by looking at me that I have a certain birth-assigned
gender or that I have a certain shape/size of genitalia, that is that person's issue, that
person's stereotyping, narrow, and incorrect belief about what it means to be female,
male, third gender, trans, genderqueer, and so on.
115. I do not like to see myself as having a body and mind that do not match. To be hon-
est, I cannot conceptualize it. My body and my mind are part of me, inseparable.
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transgender. I am a tranny with a tranny body. I am whole. I match my-
self just fine. 6 And I will gender my genitalia by myself, thank you very
much. My transwoman friend says it beautifully, "I'm a woman, this is
my body, therefore it's a female body and who is some doctor to tell me
otherwise?"' 17
Further, the sex-gender distinction cuts the body up into a hierar-
chy of pieces as described in Part II.A. I am not an assemblage of pieces,
some of which are more true than others."I8
E. No Sex-Gender Distinction, Indeed No Sex
The sex-gender division makes it seem as if there is a truth beyond
gender-something natural and inevitable-to which we can tie gen-
der.' 9 This false distinction is a way of ranking characteristics, of giving
Everyone is a whole person-a whole embodied thoughtful person-a complex per-
son. Just because I am gender non-conforming does not mean that something does
not match. I have a gender non-conforming body and a gender non-conforming
mind all wrapped in up in one gender non-conforming me. To separate out one from
the other makes it feel as if part of me is not really part of me, as if something is being
ripped away from me-and the physical sensation I have as I think of that is nausea.
116. Another conceptualization that relies on the sex-gender distinction is 'bio-boy.' See,
e.g., Butch-Femme.com, Reinforcing the Stereotype, at http://www.butch-femme.com/
portal/forums/printthread.php?threadid=4663 (last visited Feb. 19, 2005); Tram-
gender Alphabet Soup, at http://users4 .evl.net/-taragem/terms.htm (last visited Apr.
5, 2005).
"Bioboy" is used to describe non-transgender men. If non-transgender men are
biological, what am I? An alien? "Bio-boy" reinforces the idea that there is a biologi-
cal basis for gender, that non-transgender men are more "real," and that non-
transgender men are the only men who have their body match their gender identity
and can escape the mind-body split.
117. There are transgender people who do conceptualize themselves as having a mismatch
of body and mind. What is key is that the transperson defines their experience them-
selves and that it is not imposed by a doctor under a purported objectivity and truth.
118. I am not aware of any writing about the effect that a mind-body split or a split of the
body has specifically on transgender people. Eating disorders are one possible effect of
being dissociated from one's body. See, e.g., SusAN BoRto, UNBEARA LE WEIGHT:
FEMINISM, WESTERN CULTURE, AND THE BODY (1993). For other pieces on the
harms of the mind-body split, see, for example, Steven Greer, Healing the Mind/Body
Split: Bringing the Patient Back into Oncology, 2 INTEGRATIVE CANCER THERAPIES 5
(2003), at http:/lict.sagepub.com/cgi/content/abstract/2/1/5; Patrick Bracken &
Philip Thomas, Time to Move Beyond the Mind-Body Split, 325 BRIT. MED. J. 1433
(2002), at http://bmj.bmjjournals.com/cgi/content/full/325/7378/1433.
119. As Judith Butler argues, sex/gender is "the discursive/cultural means by which 'sexed
nature' or 'a natural sex' is produced and established as 'prediscursive'." Butler, supra
note 73, at 7. "[G]ender is a kind of imitation for which there is no original." Butler,
supra note 73, at 21 (emphasis omitted).
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validity to some, taking it from others, making some seem more basic
and essential than others. The sex-gender distinction leads us to devalue
that which is usually called gender. It leads us to devalue transgender
people's self-identified genders.
Sex is not truth. So, what is sex? What is the distinction between
sex and gender? Sex is the unconsented gender assignment at birth that
masks itself as objective truth. That is the only distinction: sex is
unconsented gender, and sex is gender pretending to be objective
scientific truth.
If we call the gender assignment that occurs at birth "sex," then we
give that assignment a special truth value, make it appear as if it were an
inevitable, objective truth. If we call the assignment that happens at
birth "gender assigned at birth," we call it what it is, an assignment by a
certain person at a certain time. If we give special value to the birth-
assigned gender, then we denigrate transgender people's self-assigned
gender. If we hide the fact that the birth-assigned gender is a subjective
assignment, then we see it as more real than future subjective assign-
ments. Using "sex" makes transgender people's self-identified genders
appear less real and valid. The term "sex" takes power from transgender
people. Using "sex" masks that it is in reality an unconsented gendering.
I find the concept of sex harmful and deceptive. As such, I see no point
of keeping the concept of sex. It is a myth, albeit a very powerful one. It
is a myth I would like to dethrone.
20
The gender galaxy is not a cute fanciful construct that leaves in
place 'sex' as truth. It displaces sex. Sex is gone. All that is left is the gen-
der galaxy.
121
120. "Sex is fucking, everything else is gender." Doris Rita Alfonso, Imagining Sex in
Space: How Sexual Difference Acquires Ontological Import in Plato's Timaeus 1,
173 (2002) (dissertation, State University of New York at Stony Brook); Shannon
Bell, Kate Bornstein: A Transgender Transsexual Postmodern Tiresias (Oct. 20, 1994),
at http://www.ctheory.net/text-fdle.asp?pick=61 (quoting Kate Bornstein). Sex is
fucking, everything else is the gender galaxy.
121. If we do not acknowledge the sex-gender distinction as a valid one how does that
affect women's ability to organize and work for women's rights? It is helpful since it
dethrones the idea that there is a biological, and objective, basis to sex. See Franke,
supra note 29, at 3.
If we view gender as a galaxy of non-linear, fluid options, how does that affect
the oppression of women? If we view gender as non-binary, non-linear, and fluid it is
more difficult to discriminate based on gender. The more categories there are, and
the less distinct, and the less easily recognizeable they are, the more difficult it is to
treat people differentially based on those categories. See, e.g., FRYE, supra note 69, at
1-40.
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III. TOWARD LAW AND POLICY THAT Is MoRE INCLUSIVE
OF TRANSGENDER PEOPLE
A. The Law's Relation with Transgender People-Fraught with
Difficulty, but Slowly Moving Forward
Until recently, most courts ruled against transgender people, seeing
transgender people's birth-assigned gender as natural inevitable eternal
truth and transgender people as freaks.' 22 The courts denied transgender
people the right to keep their children,123 to marry, 12 to immigrate, 125 to
Is there any harm to having more than two genders? Since having more genders
does not erase any genders, I do not see any harm.
Is there a harm to seeing birth-assigned gender as invalid, seeing sex as invalid?
People who were assigned female at birth are discriminated against. And, people who
at some point in their lives identify as women are discriminated against. There is
overlap in that discrimination and some difference. If one were treated as a
girl/woman from age one to age one hundred, one will have a different experience
than if one were treated as a girl/woman from birth to age thirty, and then treated as
a man, or if one were treated as a boy from birth to age fifteen, and then as a woman.
There is a need to work to end all gender discrimination. There is a need to organize.
There is a need for affirmative action. "Assigned female at birth" is still a valid cate-
gory under which people can organize. Women who were assigned female at birth(and all people who were assigned female at birth) can still use that category, but with
the recognition that that category is not necessarily equivalent to one's gender iden-
tity, and that the assignment process is a problematic one. And, women can organize
under the category of 'woman,' but with the understanding that that category refers
solely to self-identification and not birth assignment.
122. Until recently, the law's dealing with transgender people was dismal. In 2001, at the
National Gay and Lesbian Taskforce's Creating Change Conference, there was a
workshop on transgender legal victories. Transgender Legal Victories Workshop, Na-
tional Gay and Lesbian Taskforce Creating Change Conference (Nov. 2001).
Shannon Minter, the senior staff attorney at the National Center for Lesbian Rights,
said that five years ago, the workshop would have been thirty seconds long and con-
sisted of: "Hi, there are no victories, end of workshop."
For examples of cases that rule against transgender people in particularly insult-
ing ways, see Ulane v. E. Airlines, Inc., 742 F.2d 1081 (7th Cir. 1984) (holding that
Title VII does not apply to transgender people); Frances B. v. Mark B., 355 N.Y.S.2d
712 (1974) (holding that no valid marriage was entered into between a transgender
man and a non-transgender woman); Littleton v. Prange, 9 S.W.3d 223, 231 (Tex.
App. 1999) (holding that a transgender woman's marriage is invalid).
123. Daly v. Daly, 715 P.2d. 56 (Nev. 1986) (terminating the parental rights of a trans-
gender father).
124. In re Estate Gardiner, 42 P.3d 120 (Kan. 2002) (holding that the marriage between a
transgender woman and a non-transgender man is void); Littleton v. Prange, 9
S.W.3d 223 (Tex. App. 1999).
125. Miranda v. I.N.S., 51 F.3d 767 (8th Cir. 1995) (denying asylum to a male to female
transgender person, despite the fact that she would face social and medical hardship).
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have access to medical care, 126 and to employment without discrimina-
tion, 127 just to name a few. The courts not only ruled against transgender
people, but have done so in extraordinarily insulting ways. A few exam-
ples:
[Tihe body that Christi inhabits is a male body in all aspects
other than what the physicians have supplied .... There are
some things we cannot will into being.... We hold, as a
matter of law, that Christi Littleton is a male. 
128
[Ulane is] a person born with a male body who believes
himself to be female .... But even if one believes that a
woman can be so easily created from what remains of a man, that
does not decide this case."
129
Mark is a male entrapped in the body of a female, the record
does not show that the entrapped male successfully escaped
130
Fortunately, there have been recent advances in both case law and
statutory law. In 1989, the court in Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins held that
a masculine woman, Ann Hopkins, was protected from job discrimina-
tion under sex-discrimination laws, specifically Title VII.
3
' The court
Five years later, a gender non-conforming gay man was granted asylum in Hernan-
dez-Montiel v. I.N.S., 225 F.3d 1084 (9th Cir. 2000). In the latter decision, the
word "transgender" was not used.
126. For people who are not prisoners, insurance coverage for medical care is commonly
decided on a case by case basis. See, e.g., Pinneke v. Preisser, 623 F.2d 546, 549 (8th
Cir. 1980) (where the court found that Iowa's policy of denying Medicaid benefits
for sex-reassignment surgery when it was a medical necessity for treatment of trans-
sexualism was not consistent with the objectives of the Medicaid statute); Doe v.
Dep't of Public Welfare, 257 N.W.2d 816, 820 (Minn. 1977) (where the court
found that the denial of medical assistance benefits to adult male transsexual was arbi-
trary and unreasonable). Medical care for prisoners is often denied. See, e.g.,
Meriwether v. Faulkner, 821 F.2d 408, 413 (7th Cir. 1987) (denial of hormone
treatment); Supre v. Ricketts, 792 F.2d, 958, 963 (10th Cir. 1986)(denial of estrogen
treatment); Lamb v. Maschner, 633 F. Supp. 351, 353-54 (D. Kan. 1986) (denial
hormone treatment and surgery).
127. Ulane v. E. Airlines, Inc., 742 F.2d 1081, 1085, 1087 (7th Cir. 1984).
128. Litteton, 9 S.W.3d at 231.
129. Ulane, 742 F.2d at 1085, 1087 (emphasis added).
130. Frances B. v. Mark B., 355 N.Y.S.2d 712, 717 (Sup. Ct. 1974).
131. Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins, 490 U.S. 228, 251 (1989).
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held that gender stereotypes, such as requiring that a woman wear heels
and make-up, are sex-discrimination. 32
In 2000, relying on Price Waterhouse, the Ninth Circuit held that
sex discrimination laws apply to transgender people.13 3 Schwenk v. Hart-
ford is the case of a transgender woman who was held in an all-male
prison where she was sexually harassed and assaulted. She sued under
the Gender Motivated Violence Act (GMVA). The court found that the
GMVA applies to transgender people and that the attack on Ms.
Schwenk was gender-motivated.134 This decision follows and extends
Price Waterhouse, holding that transgender people are protected under
sex discrimination laws. To demand that a transgender person present
themselves to society in a way that matches the stereotypes associated
with their birth-assigned gender is gender stereotyping. 35
Since 2000, a series of courts have followed the lead of Schwenk
and ruled that sex discrimination laws protect transgender people. 3 6 For
instance, in Enriquez v. West Jersey Health Systems, the New Jersey Supe-
rior Court held that state sex discrimination laws apply to transgender
people.1 7 An MTF doctor, Dr. Enriquez, was fired from her hospital
132. Hopkins, 490 U.S. at 251.
133. Schwenk v. Hartford, 204 F.3d 1187 (9th Cit. 2000).
134. Harford, 204 F.3d at 1200-02.
135. Hartford, 204 F.3d at 1201.
136. For additional recent cases which hold that transgender people are protected under
sex discrimination laws, see Lie v. Sky Publishing Corp., 15 Mass. L. Rep. 412 (Mass.
Super. 2002)(A transgender woman was told by her employer that she had to wear
men's clothing. The court found that she had established a prima facia case of sex
discrimination.); Jette v. Honey Farms Mini Market, 2001 WL 1602799 (Mass.
Comm'n Against Discrim., Oct. 10, 2001) (A transgender woman was not allowed to
wear women's dothes-and was fired. The court found that she had a claim under
sex discrimation.); Millett v. Lutco, Inc., 2001 WL 1602800 (Mass. Comm'n
Against Discrim., Oct. 10, 2001) (A transgender woman was issued a pretextural
warning after disclosing that she is transgender. The court found that she had a daim
under sex discrimination.); Doe v. Yunits, No. 00-1060A, 2000 WL 33162199
(Mass. Super. Ct. Oct. 11, 2 000)(order granting preliminary injunction)(holding
that a transgender student who was told that she had to wear boys clothing may have
a claim under state sex discrimination laws); Rentos v. OCE-Office Sys., 72 Fair
Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) 1717 (S.D.N.Y. 1996) (The court did not dismiss a case of a
transgender woman who was discriminated against by her employer.); Maffei v.
Kolaeton Indus., Inc., 626 N.Y.S.2d 391 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1995 (A transgender woman
was subjected to a hostile work environment. The court found that the municipal sex
discrimination law applied.) See also National Center for Lesbian Rights, Cases Recog-
nizing Protection for Transgender People Under State Sex and Disability Discrimination
Provisions, at http://www.ndrights.org/publications/transprotect09O4.htm (last vis-
ited Feb. 21, 2005).
137. Enriquez v. W. Jersey Health Sys., 777 A.2d 365 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 2001),
cert. denied, 785 A.2d 439 (N.J. 2001).
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soon after she started wearing women's clothes."8 Dr. Enriquez sued un-
der state employment discrimination laws under the protected category
of sex and won."'
Another recent avenue of protection for transgender people is dis-
ability law.'4 For instance, in Enriquez, Dr. Enriquez also sued under
state disability protections, and succeeded. 4' The court held that trans-
gender people are covered under disability protections given that gender
dysphoria is a recognized psychological condition. 142 Not all people in
the transgender and disability communities, however, agree that trans-
gender people should use disability law.
43
138. Enriquez, 777 A.2d at 368.
139. Enriquez, 777 A.2d at 373.
140. For cases which hold that transgender people are protected under disability protec-
tions, see Doe v. Bell, 754 N.Y.S.2d 846 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 2003) (The court held that a
transgender youth in the foster care system was protected by state disability protec-
tions in housing); Lie, 15 Mass. L. Rep. at 412 (A transgender woman was told by
her employer that she had to wear men's clothing. The court found that she had es-
tablished a prima facia case under disability protections.); Jette, 2001 WL 1602799
(A transgender woman was not allowed to wear women's clothes and was fired. The
court found that she had a claim under disablity protections.); Millett, 2001 WL
1602800 (A transgender woman was issued a pretextural warning after disclosing that
she is transgender. The court found that she had a claim under disability protec-
tions.); Yunits, 15 Mass. L. Rptr. 278 (Mass. Super. Ct. Feb. 26, 2001)(The court
found that a transgender student may be protected by disability law.); Smith v. City of
Jacksonville Corr. Inst., 1991 WL 833882 (Fla. Div. Admin. Hrgs.) (The court held
that a person with gender dysphoria is covered by disability law.); Doe v. Electro-Craft
Corporation, 1988 WL 1091932 (N.H. Super. Ct.) (The court held that transgender
people are covered under disability in state employment laws.) See also National Cen-
ter for Lesbian Rights, Cases Recognizing Protection for Transgender People Under State
Sex and Disability Discrimination Provisions, at http://www.ndrights.org/
publications/transprotect09O4 .htm (last visited Feb. 21, 2005).
141. Enriquez, 777A.2d at 380.
142. Enriquez, 777 A.2d at 376-77.
143. Those who argue for the use of disability law commonly assert that a) there currently
are few effective protections for transgender people, and we have to use whatever we
can; b) disability law is not stigmatizing; and c) transgender people should be allies to
other people who are seen as 'different' in our society and, for better or for worse,
disability law is the way that United States law deals with people who are different
from a mythical norm. Those who argue against the use of disability law commonly
assert that a) disability law is stigmatizing; b) disability law relies heavily on a medical
model of being transgender (requiring a psychiatric diagnosis of 'gender dysphoria'),
which works only for some transgender people and leaves out transgender people who
have no access to the medical system; and c) transgender people, and all people,
should be able to demand equal treatment without apologizing for their existence and
claiming to have a disorder. For an excellent discussion, see Spade, supra note 36.
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Further, there are now four states, ten counties, and fifty-one cities
that provide statutory protections for transgender people.' A recent
legislative example is the "Gender Non-Discrimination Act of 2003" in
which the California Fair Employment and Housing Act was amended
to include gender identity under existing sex discrimination protec-
• 145
tions.
Yet, there are still limitations to many of these victories. Currently,
there is virtually no legal recognition of people who do not identify as
female or male and thus, virtually no explicit protections for people who
do not identify as female or male." 14
Further, there is little legal protection available for transgender
141people who do not fit the most narrow stereotypical gender norms.
There is virtually no case law or regulation that recognizes transgenderpeop e's elfidenifie . 148
people's self-identified gender. There is almost no case law in which
the court takes the person at their word when the person says they are a
woman or a man (any other gender identification is not even an op-
tion). The court gets to ask: "This case involves the most basic of
144. E.g., Ann Arbor, Mich., Ordinance No. 10-99 (1999); Atlanta, Ga., Ordinance No.
00-0074 (2000); San Francisco, Cal., Ordinance No. 433-94 (1994). See Trans-
gender Law and Policy Institute for a list of cities, counties, and states that have
protections for transgender people, at http://www.transgenderlaw.org/ndlaws/
chart.pdf (last visited Apr. 5, 2005).
145. Assem. Bill 196, 2003-2004 Reg. Sess. (Cal. 2003) (amending Cal. Gov't Code
§ 12926, adding § 12949).
146. There are a few exceptions. In January 2004, San Francisco passed Compliance Guide-
lines to Prohibit Gender Identity Discrimination that explicitly and in practice protect
transgender people who do not identify as female or male. Compliance Guidelines, su-
pra note 64. The Regulations interpret the San Francisco Administrative and Police
Codes that list gender identity as one of the protected categories. San Francisco, Cal.
Admin. Code § 12A (2002) (general), § 12B (2002) (employment, city contractors),
§ 12C (2002) (public accommodations, city contractor); San Francisco, Cal., Mun.
(Police) Code § 33 (2002) (employment, housing, public accommodations, in city
limits). The San Francisco Unified School District adopted Regulations that explic-
itly and practically protect transgender people who do not identify as female or male,
at http:l/www.transgenderlaw.org/college/sfusdpolicy.htm (last visited Apr. 5, 2005).
Further, there are laws, such as California's Assembly Bill 196, supra note 145, that
were written without gendered language so as to be inclusive of people who do not
identify as female or male.
147. For cases that require that transgender people fit stereotypical gender norms, see supra
note 5.
148. The only legislative exception that explicitly states that a person's self-identified gen-
der is the only criterion of that person's gender are the new S.F. Human Rights
Comm'n, Compliance Guidelines, supra note 64. For discussion on requirements
other than self-identification, see Spade, supra note 36.
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questions. When is a man a man, and when is a woman a woman?" '49
And the court, not the transgender person, gets to answer.
B. The Sex-Gender Distinction Is One of the Most Harmful Underlying
Concepts Used by Courts Across the Board
The courts' lack of recognition of people who are not stereotypi-
cally male or stereotypically female, of people who do not identify as
female or male, and generally, of people who self-identify their gender, I
trace, in large part, to the courts' reliance on the sex-gender distinc-
tion. 50 If we see sex as biology and gender as social construct, then we
give sex more import and make it more real. If sex, that which we are
assigned at birth by doctors, is seen as more real, then transgender peo-
ple's self-identification, which is different from the assignment at birth,
is necessarily seen as less real."' This distinction allows courts to see the
transgender person's birth-assigned sex as an ultimate truth that most
likely cannot be overcome. To overcome the truth of birth-assigned sex
requires a host of medical experts to list all of the ways in which the
transgender person is gender conforming. 5 2 In my experience, a person
who was assigned male at birth and identifies as female has the best
chance of having her self-identified gender confirmed by the courts if
her medical experts testify that she is a feminine woman, a woman who
played with dolls when she was young, a heterosexual woman, a woman
with genital surgery, and so on. A gender non-conforming transgender
person stands very little chance of having their self-identified gender
recognized by the courts. 53 And since courts fall heavily on the side of
149. Littleton v. Prange, 9 S.W.3d 223, 223 (Tex. App. 1999).
150. See, e.g., In re Estate of Gardiner, 42 P.3d 120 (Kan. 2002); Goins v. West Group,
635 N.W.2d 717 (Minn. 2001); M.T. v. J.T., 355 A.2d 204 (N.J. Super. App. Div.
1976); Frances B. v. Mark B., 355 N.Y.S.2d 712 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1974); Hartin v.
Dir. of Bureau of Records & Statistics, 347 N.Y.S.2d 515 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1973);
Anonymous v. Weiner, 270 N.Y.S.2d 319 (N.Y. Sup. Ct 1966).
151. For discussion, please see supra Part II.A.
152. See, e.g., Kantaras v. Kantaras, No. 98-5375, slip op. at 40-55, 64, 795 (Fla. Cir. Ct.
2003), available at http://www.transgenderlaw.org/cases/kantarasopinion.pdf; In re
Estate of Gardiner, 42 P.3d at 122-24; M.T., 355 A.2d at 210; Frances B., 355
N.Y.S.2d at 713-18; Littleton, 9 S.W.3d at 223, 225.
153. No known case has been brought by a transgender person who does not (or is not
made to) fit into a significant number of stereotypes. I suspect that this is so because
many existing cases harp on stereotypes and it then seems futile. See supra note 5. I
had conversations with transgender legal activists who are hesitant to push cases in
which the transgender person does not fit stereotypes and has not had genital surgery.
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birth-assigned gender, which is always female or male, courts tend to
only acknowledge and discuss female and male genders as options.'54
Since the sex-gender distinction creates a conceptual framework in
which birth-assigned gender is seen as an objective truth,"' it is likely
that halting the use of this distinction would create an environment in
which self-identified and non-binary genders can be recognized. If the
courts recognized the existence of non-binary genders and the impor-
tance of self-identification, then more transgender people would be
legally protected.
In the next section, the article looks at representative cases, both
from the 1970s as well as recent cases from 2001 to 2003 to show how
the courts' use of the sex-gender distinction is harmful and limiting.
C. Cases that Use the Sex-Gender Distinction
The sex-gender distinction was the underlying framework in case
law in the 1970s. The use of this conceptualization denigrated gender
self-identification and validated gender identification by medical ex-
perts, who often used heteronormative and sexist definitions of women
and men. I start this section by looking at several representative cases
from the 1970s.
Unfortunately, the same definitions based on the sex-gender
distinction that operated 30 years ago have not left us. Some recent cases
look virtually identical to the older cases. I end the section with a
discussion of recent cases that use the same reasoning as the older cases.
1. Hartin v. Director of Bureau of Records
In 1973, the New York Superior Court addressed the case of Ms.
Hartin 5 6 Ms. Hartin was a transgender woman who wanted to change
her birth certificate to reflect her female gender, in other words, to
change the gender marker from male to female. 5 7 Before allowing Ms.
Hartin to change the gender marker on her birth certificate to female,
154. See supra note 150 for decisions in which courts fall heavily on the side of birth-
assigned gender.
155. Please see Part II.A.
156. Hartin v. Dir. of Bureau of Records & Statistics, 347 N.Y.S.2d 515 (N.Y. Sup. Ct.
1973).
157. Hartin, 347 N.Y.S.2d at 516.
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the court wanted to determine whether or not Ms. Hartin was truly a
158
woman.
The court began by providing the framework under which this
gender decision would be made. The court described transgender people
as follows: "the male-to-female transsexual, such as here, is anatomically
and chromosomally a male who is deeply disturbed in his gender orien-
tation and role. He has an overpowering desire to be a woman."' 9 The
court spoke of biological truth, the permanence of that truth, and Ms.
Hartin's attempt to hide that truth and to betray the world. 160 The court
spoke of Ms. Hartin's male physiology, of "original sex," of male body
cells, of male sexuality, of "mutilating surgery," and of fraud and
deception.16 ' According to the court, Ms. Hartin (referred to as "he")
wanted to be a woman, but, unfortunately, was biologically and truly
male.i's is a framework in which birth-assigned gender is objective bi-
ology and self-identified gender is a psychological disturbance.6 6 This
framework relies on the sex-gender distinction, in which sex is seen as
biology, and gender is seen as social and psychological. By looking at
gender through the lens of the sex-gender distinction, the court has al-
ready made its decision. Birth-assigned sex, being an ultimate truth,
cannot be overcome. Ms. Hartin's subjective desire is pitted against an
objective physicality and truth: gender versus sex. She is bound to lose,
and she does lose. She is denied the chance to make her birth certificate
reflect her gender. 1
64
158. Hartin, 347 N.Y.S.2d at 517. The Hartin court asks whether a male to female trans-
gender person is a woman. Its question is not as blunt as that of the Littleton court,
which asks, "When is a man a man, and when is a woman a woman?" Littleton v.
Prange, 9 S.W.3d 223, 223 (Tex. App. 1999).
159. Hartin, 347 N.Y.S.2d at 517.
160. Hartin, 347 N.Y.S.2d at 517-18.
161. Hartin, 347 N.Y.S.2d at 517 (citing Comm. on Pub. Health of the N.Y. Academy of
Med., Change of Sex on Birth Certificates for Transsexuals (Oct. 4, 1965)).
162. Hartin, 347 N.Y.S.2d at 517.
163. John Ohle also questions the objectivity of the initial birth assignment in Hartin.
According to Ohle, the initial birth assignment is a doctor's perception. Perceptions
can change. So, this perception also should be able to change. Moreover, other per-
ceptions should count as well. Ohle, supra note 28, at 254.
164. Hartin, 347 N.Y.S.2d at 518.
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2. Anonymous v. Weiner
A few years before, in 1966, the New York Superior Court made a
virtually identical gender decision."' Ms. Weiner, a transgender woman,
also wanted to change her birth certificate.'6 In its determination of Ms.
Weiner's gender, the definition that guides this inquiry is: a transsexual
is someone who has a "striking disturbance of gender role and gender
orientation.., a split between the psychological and the morphological
sex."'67 In other words, the transgender persons objective body and sub-
jective mental state do not match. Again, this is the sex-gender
distinction; sex is physical and objective, gender is in the head.
Determining Ms. Weiner's gender in this framework, the court
spoke of Ms. Weiner's definitive chromosomal maleness, of a failed at-
tempt to change, and of fraud.6 To help the court answer the question
of Ms. Weiner's gender, the court used an array of gender experts: "gy-
necologists, endocrinologists, cytogenetics, psychiatrists and a lawyer."' 69
Since Ms. Weiner had to overcome an objective biological truth (her
sex), she had to use testimony that the court would understand as bio-
logically objective: testimony by medical practitioners. Her own
testimony on her gender was not seen as objective.170 And even the pur-
portedly objective testimony of the medical practitioners was not
enough to overcome the ultimate truth of birth-assigned gender. The
court concluded that no error was made on the original birth certificate,
that it correctly states that Ms. Weiner is male. 7'
165. Anonymous v. Weiner, 270 N.Y.S.2d 319 (N.Y. Sup. Ct 1966).
166. Weiner, 270 N.Y.S.2d at 320.
167. Weiner, 270 N.Y.S.2d at 320 (quoting Harry Benjamin, Nature and Management of
Transsexualism, 72 W. J. SURGERY, OBSTETRICS & GYNECOLOGY 105 (1964)).
168. Weiner, 270 N.Y.S.2d at 321-22.
169. Weiner, 270 N.Y.S.2d at 321. Jody Madeira sees Weiner as the beginning of a legal
trend to value biology in determining transgender people's gender. Jody Lynee Ma-
deira, Law as a Reflection of Her/His-Story: Current Institutional Perceptions of and
Possibilities for, Protecting Transsexuals' Interests in Legal Determinations of Sex, 5 U.
PA. J. CONST. L. 128, 146 (2002).
170. Weiner, 270 N.Y.S.2d at 319-21. Throughout the entire case, only the medical and
legal authorities are taken seriously. For an outline of the insulting language used to
describe transgender people in Weiner, see Helen G. Berrigan, Transsexual Marriage:
A Trans-AdanticJudicial Dialogue, 12 L. & SExuALmT 87, 89-91 (2002).
171. Weiner, 270 N.Y.S.2d at 324.
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3. Frances B. v. Mark B
In 1974, the New York Superior Court was still using the frame-
work of the sex-gender distinction.17 1 In Frances B. v. Mark B., the court
addressed the issue of the validity of a marriage between a transgender
person and a non-transgender person.17 Mark was a transgender man
who had married Frances, a non-transgender woman. 4 After years of
being together, Frances wanted to annul her marriage to Mark.175 She
claimed that she had been deceived as to Mark's gender, that Mark was
not a man and that he was never her husband because marriage can only
occur between a man and a woman. 176 Again, the issue the court chose
to make central is the issue of Mark's gender, is Mark a man or a
woman?177
The definition that guides this inquiry is that "Transsexuals
strongly believe that their physical anatomies do not reflect their true
genders."'7 Again, this framework is one that pits biology against belief,
sex against gender.
Following this framework, Dr. Burou testified: "I don't change men
into women. I transform male genitals into genitals that have a female
aspect. All the rest is in the patient's mind."' Further, since objective
biology is what mattered in the court's chosen framework, the court ex-
amined Mark's biology, particularly his genital biology.'88 The court
concluded that Mark "does not have male sexual organs, does not pos-
sess a normal penis, and in fact does not have a penis."'' The court
found that Mark was not able to "perform male functions in a mar-
172. Frances B. v. Mark B., 355 N.Y.S.2d 712 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1974).
173. Frances B., 355 N.Y.S.2d at 714.
174. Frances B., 355 N.Y.S.2d at 714.
175. Frances B., 355 N.Y.S.2d at 714.
176. Frances B., 355 N.Y.S.2d at 713-14.
177. Frances B., 355 N.Y.S.2d at 716-17. Melissa Aubin discusses how courts take it upon
themselves to determine gender (and so whether or not one can marry). See Melissa
Aubin, Defying Classification: Intestacy Issues for Transsexual Surviving Spouses, 82 OR.
L. REv. 1155 (2003).
178. Frances B., 355 N.Y.S.2d at 714.
179. Frances B., 355 N.Y.S.2d at 717.
180. Frances B., 355 N.Y.S.2d at 717.
181. Frances B., 355 N.Y.S.2d at 717. Mary Coombs argues that the court did not distin-
guish between potency and fertility (the latter having historically been a ground for
annulling a marriage.) Mary Coombs, Sexual Dis-orientation: Transgendered People
and Same-Sex Marriage, 8 UCLA WOMEN'S L.J. 219, 252-53 (1998).
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riage." 1 2 This court used ability (and willingness) to participate in her-
eronormative sexuality as a prerequisite for manhood. 18 3 Mark's genitals
and assumed sexuality made him a woman in the court's eyes. According
to the court, Mark's male gender was all in his head. And what is in
Mark's head was not sufficient. Mark "was a male entrapped in the body
of a female, [and] the record does not show that the entrapped male
successfully escaped."'', 4 The court concurred with the plaintiff and con-
cluded that Mark "was and still is a woman, a member of the Female
Gender of the Human Species.""'5 And the court, again concerned with
fraud, annulled Mark and Frances's marriage.
86
4. M.T. v. J.T
In 1976, the New Jersey appellate court addressed another marriage
case."'7 J was a transgender woman married to M, a non-transgender
man. 8" M tried to annul the marriage using the same argument as in
Frances, that there never was a marriage, since J was not a woman.189
Here as well, the main issue at hand was J's true gender. In making this
determination, the court's guiding concept was: a transgender person is
someone who has "a great discrepancy between the physical genital
anatomy and the person's sense of self-identity,"' 9 who "firmly believes
he belongs to the other sex."' 9'
Since the sex-gender distinction was the guiding framework, pur-
portedly objective biology, J's genitalia, had to be examined. J did have
genital surgery.) 2 Her doctor testified that after surgery, J's genitalia
looked like the genitalia of people who are assigned female at birth.' 93
Further, her doctor testified that J was able to perform normative het-
182. Frances B., 355 N.Y.S.2d at 717. For a discussion of courts' requirement of penis-
vagina-penetration in transgender cases, see Karla Robertson, Note, Penetrating Sex
and Marriage. The Progressive Potential of Addressing Bisexuality in Queer Theory, 75
DENv. U. L. REv. 1375, 1377-82 (1998).
183. Frances B., 355 N.Y.S.2d at 717.
184. Frances B., 355 N.Y.S.2d at 717.
185. Frances B., 355 N.Y.S.2d at 713.
186. Frances B., 355 N.Y.S.2d at 717.
187. M.T. v. J.T., 355 A.2d 204 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1976).
188. M.T., 355 A.2d at 205.
189. MT., 355 A.2d at 205.
190. M. T, 355 A.2d at 205 (quoting plaintiffs medical doctor).
191. MT., 355 A.2d at 207 (quoting trial judge).
192. M.T., 355 A.2d at 206.
193. M.T., 355 A.2d at 206.
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erosexual intercourse 4 and that J was unable to function sexually or
reproductively as a male.' 95 Here, a woman is defined by lack, lack of
male function.)" In this case, the court was willing to see J as a woman
and so to uphold the marriage.' 97
This case shows that it is possible to win, even when the sex-gender
distinction is operative. But, J did not win because of her self-identity. J
won because she had genital surgery and doctors testified as to her
heterosexuality. That is not what it should take to win.'
And that is not a guarantee that one will win. The court could have
easily found that J's genitalia were not sufficiently female or heterosexu-
ally functioning since those are vague, if not meaningless, terms.'99 With
the sex-gender definition as the frame, there is always a hurdle to over-
come, a hurdle of a truth that is not one's own, a truth that will be
established by many professionals, a truth that is only available to those
with the financial means to have surgery and to hire a team of medical
experts, and a truth that will be judged as true enough-or not-by a
court.
194. MT, 355 A.2d at 206. The court used a very limited view of heterosexual inter-
course and of male sexual functioning.
195. M.T., 355 A.2d at 206.
196. MT., 355 A.2d at 206.
197. MT., 355 A.2d at 210. John Fisher puts MT in the category of cases which ac-
knowledge a transgender person's gender albeit after surgery. John Fisher, Sex
Determination fir Federal Purposes: Is Transsexual Immigration Via Marriage Permissi-
ble under the Defense of Marriage Act? 10 MICH. J. GENDER & L. 237, 254 (2004).
Terry Kogan finds M. T. problematic because of its emphasis on sexual function.
Terry Kogan, Transsexuals, Intersexuals, and Same-Sex Marriage, 18 BYU J. PUB. L.
371, 385-86 (2004). I do not see this case as an advancement. This court did allow a
transgender person to meet its standards. But I object to the standards: genital sur-
gery and heterosexuality.
198. Neither all men nor all women are heterosexual. To require heterosexuality for real
manhood or real womanhood is homophobic. To require surgery discriminates
against those transgender people who either do not want surgery or cannot afford it.
Thus, a surgical requirement is either classist and/or forces genital surgery upon peo-
ple who do nor want it. See supra Part I.A.3. I find that the best requirement is that of
self-identification. For examples of laws that honor self-identification, see supra note
146.
199. Does "heterosexually functioning" refer to a specific act? If so, which one? Does it
refer to penis/vagina penetration? Does it refer to penis/vagina penetration with fer-
tilization? Does it refer to the touching of a vagina by a person with a penis (with
fingers, with the mouth, etc.)? Does it refer to the insertion of a dildo by a person
with a vagina into the anus of a person with a penis? Does it refer to any sexual activ-
ity that any heterosexual couple engages in?
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5. Goins v. West Group
Twenty-five years later, in 2001, the highest court in Minnesota
addressed the issue of bathroom access. s Ms. Julienne Goins, a trans-
gender woman, worked at Wesdaw, where she wanted to use the
women's restroom just like any other woman.0 1 Westlaw refused, and
the matter went to court.2 The main issue is whether or not Ms. Goins
is a 'true' woman. The court began by describing Ms. Goins's gender,
saying "Julienne Goins was designated male at birth and given the name
Justin Travis Goins, but Goins was confused about that sexual identity
throughout much of childhood and adolescence."" Julienne Goins's




This is the classic sex-gender distinction: sex is biology, gender is
self-image and confusion.2 0 ' Given this conceptualization of gender and
of being transgender, it is no surprise that the court found that Ms.
Goins cannot use the women's restroom, that designating bathrooms by
birth-assigned gender is not discrimination, that birth-assigned gender is
what matters in this world and that self-identified gender does not.20
200. Goins v. West Group, Inc., 635 N.W.2d 717 (Minn. 2001).
201. Goins, 635 N.W.2d at 720-21.
202. Goins, 635 N.W.2d at 721.
203. Goins, 635 N.W.2d at 722.
204. Goins, 635 N.W.2d at 721.
205. Jenifer Ross-Amato's article describes in detail the history of the Goins case. The arti-
cle points out that it is problematic for the court to use "biological gender" without
defining it. The article also points out the limitations of using a binary view of gen-
der. Yet, the article leaves the sex-gender distinction in place. Jenifer M. Ross-Amato,
Transgender Employees and Restroom Designation-Goins v. West Group, Inc., 29
WM. MITCHELL L. Rav. 569, 588-90 (2002). Samantha Levy finds that the court's
distinction between "gender" and "biological gender" in Goins is arbitrary. She does
not argue that this distinction is the problem in and of itself. She advocates for the
use of a different protected category, i.e. protecting transgender people under "trans-
gender" or "gender identity," instead of under "gender." Samantha Levy, Trans-
Forming Notions of Equal Protection: The Gender Identity Class, 12 TEMP. POL. & CIv.
Rts. L. Rev. 141, 157-59 (2003). I do not think that the problem lies in protecting
transgender people under "gender." Transgender people have a gender, and it is
transgender people's gender that is at issue in these cases. I think the problem lies in
having a binary, linear, static view of gender that has as its backdrop the mythical bio-
logical sex, i.e. is distinguished from sex. See supra Part II.
206. Goins, 635 N.W.2d at 723. Richard Storrow describes this decision as one that evis-
cerates the Minnesota state protections by holding that transgender protections do
not extend to bathrooms. Richard Storrow, Gender Typing in Stereo: The Transgender
Dilemma in Employment Discrimination, 55 ME. L. REv. 117, 151-53 (2003). I
agree. It does not make much sense to say that a transgender person is protected in
employment as long as they do not go to the restroom. Lisa Moltet also urges us to
take restroom access seriously. Lisa Mottet, Access to Gender-Appropriate Bathrooms: A
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The one-sentence concurrence starkly states the hurdle that Ms.
Goins had to meet: "[Ms.] Goins must establish that she is biologically
female.""0 7 Again, birth-assigned gender is biological truth that must be
overcome by something other than self-identified gender. "Sex" is truth.
6. In re Estate of Gardiner
In 2002, in Kansas, Mrs. J'Noel Gardiner, a transgender woman,
was taken to court by her husband's family.2 8 Mrs. Gardiner was mar-
ried to a non-transgender man, who had died.20 9 Her husband's relatives
did not want Mrs. Gardiner to get her husband's inheritance. 2'0 They
attempted to keep the inheritance themselves by claiming that there
never was a marriage since Mrs. Gardiner is not a woman.21 ' Again, the
issue at hand is Mrs. Gardiner's gender.2
This court also focuses on "biology" and testimony from medical
"experts., 21 3 Here we see again just how difficult it is to overcome the
hurdle of biology, of sex, of birth-assigned gender, of truth. J'Noel's doc-
tor testified that she is "a functioning, anatomical female." 214 Still, the
court states, "we recognize that J'Noel has traveled a long and difficult
road. J'Noel has undergone electrolysis, thermolysis, tracheal shave,
hormone injections, extensive counseling, and reassignment surgery.
Unfortunately, after all that, J'Noel remains a transsexual, and a
male." 21 5 The court pits self-identified gender against birth gender-a
216
situation that makes it virtually impossible to win. Even after having
Frustrating Diversion on the Path to Transgender Equality, 4 GEO. J. GENDER & L. 739
(2003).
207. Goins, 635 N.W.2d at 726.
208. In re Estate of Gardiner, 42 P.3d 120 (Kan. 2002).
209. Gardiner, 42 P.3d at 121, 123.
210. Gardiner, 42 P.3dat 121.
211. Gardiner, 42 P.3d at 121-22.
212. Gardiner, 42 P.3d at 124.
213. Gardiner, 42 P.3d at 121-24.
214. Gardiner, 42 P.3d at 123.
215. Gardiner, 42 P.3d at 137. John Fisher points out that the court, though purportedly
applying a common sense definition of "sex," is creating its own standards. Fisher, su-
pra note 197, at 251-52.
216. No matter what physical intervention J'Noel undergoes, this court will still make her
lose: "Her female anatomy, however, is still all man-made. The body J'Noel inhabits
is a male body in all aspects other than what the physicians have supplied." In re Es-
tate of Gardiner, 42 P.3d at 124. John Ohle writes about the Gardiner court using the
gender assigned at birth as the determining gender. Ohle, supra note 28, at 256.
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had every possible medical intervention, Mrs. Gardiner still loses.217
Thus it appears that no particular amount or type of medical interven-
211tion guarantees that one can overcome the "truth" of sex.
This unfortunate decision overturned a prior state court decision
that did find for Mrs. Gardiner. That decision ended with a respectful
statement of the importance of self-identification and that the role of
doctors and courts is not to be arbiters of gender, but to listen to
transgender people and to believe transgender when we say who we are:
"In the end it is only the children themselves who can and
must identify who and what they are. It is for us as clinicians
and researchers to listen and to learn. Clinical decisions must
ultimately be based not on anatomical predictions, nor on the
'correctness' of sexual function.... ,21 9
D. One Case that Moves away fom the Sex-Gender Distinction:
Doe v. Yunits
The Gardiner quotation demonstrates that courts are capable of
viewing gender in a way that does not automatically denigrate self-
identified gender. Doe v. Yunits does not rely on the sex-gender distinc-
220tion. In 2000, the Massachusetts Superior Court heard the case of a
young transgender woman whose gender identity was not respected in
her high school. 22' Her principal told her that she could not wear
217. In re Estate of Gardiner, 42 P.3d at 124. Anthony Winer criticizes courts such as the
one in Gardiner for using an assimilationist criteria, i.e., that in order to be a real
woman, a transgender person must assimilate to, as much as possible, the stereotype
of a woman. Winer, supra note 70, at 665.
218. See Winer, supra note 70, at 665-66.
219. In re Estate of Gardiner, 22 P.3d 1086, 1110 (Kan. 2001) (quoting William Reiner,
To Be Male or Female-That Is the Question, 151 Archives Pediatrics & Adolescent
Med. 224-25 (1997)).
220. Doe v. Yunits, No. 00-1060A, 2000 WL 33162199, at *1 (Mass. Super. Ct. Oct. 11,
2000)(order granting preliminary injunction); Doe v. Yunits, 15 Mass. L. Rptr. 278
(Mass. Super. Ct. Feb. 26, 2001). The earlier and overruled decision, In Re Estate of
Gardiner, though finding for the transgender person and doing so quite respectfully,
did use the sex-gender distinction in describing transgender people. In re Estate of
Gardiner, 22 P.3d at 1093. This court, however, spent pages detailing biological di-
versity, thus undoing the belief that gender is definitively assigned at birth or binary.
Id. at 1093-1100. By dethroning birth assignment as binary ultimate truth, the court
in effect moves away from the sex-gender distinction.
221. Yunits, 2000 WL 33162199, at ,1.
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women's clothes to school, and the principal humiliated her daily.
22
2
Each day, she had to go by the principal's office where the principal
would examine her outfit and determine whether it was male enough or
not. If he thought it was not, he would send her home.22
What sets this case apart from other cases is that the young
woman's gender is not in question and is not an issue for the court or a
question to be decided by the court. The court refers to the young
woman as "she" and "her" throughout and respects her self-identified
gender.224 The question for the court is not whether or not she is a
woman, but whether or not she can wear woman's clothes. 22 Granted,
those two questions are inextricably intertwined. It is not possible to
216
separate one's gender identity from one's choice of clothing. And a
non-transgender woman would most likely not be told that she could
not wear any women's clothing or any women's accessories. 27 It is re-
freshing, however, to see a case that does not discuss in detail the
transgender person's childhood activities, medical history, and genital
configuration. The court acknowledged that by asking about clothing, it
was asking about an essential feature of gender:
Plaintiff in this case is likely to establish that, by dressing in
clothing and accessories traditionally associated with the fe-
male gender, she is expressing her identification with that
gender. In addition, plaintiff's ability to express herself and her
gender identity through dress is important to her health and
well-being, as attested to by her treating therapist. Therefore,
plaintiff's expression is not merely a personal preference but a
necessary symbol of her very identity.""
222. Yunits, 2000 WL 33162199, at "1.
223. Yunits, 2000 WL 33162199, at "1.
224. Yunirs, 2000 WL 33162199, at *1-8.
225. Yunits, 2000 WL 33162199, at *3, 6.
226. Yunits, 2000 WL 33162199, at *3. See also, e.g, Madeira, supra note 88, at 138
(quoting STEPHEN WHITTLE, THE TRANSGENDER DEBATE: THE CISIS SURROUND-
ING GENDER IDENTITY 5 (2000)).
227. See Yunits, 2000 WL 33162199, at *2, 6-7.
228. Yunits, 2000 WL 33162199, at *3. A physician was consulted, even in this case. Per-
haps it will take a long time before we can talk about gender without citing a doctor.
However, in this case, the physician did not testify as to the young woman's child-
hood, sexual practices, or medical history. Nor did he provide detailed information
about her body. Yunits, 2000 WL 33162199, at "1, 3.
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Clothing is gender. And a transgender person has just as much a
right to express her gender as does a non-transgender person. The court
says,
In essence, the plaintiff alleges that requiring Doe to wear
boy's clothing to school would be as injurious to her psychiat-
ric health as requiring a psychologically masculine boy to wear
a dress to school. 2 9
And the court recognizes that no one can be anything but the
gender they are:
Certainly, a student who is five feet tall may be deemed con-
structively expelled if the school administrators forbade her
from returning until she became six feet tall, because she could
not do anything to satisfy that condition." 0
This court did not rely on the usual biology-mind, sex-gender dis-
tinction. This court recognized that dress is integral to gender-that
dress is real, as real as biology. And this court found that it was likely
discriminatory to forbid her to wear women's clothes just as any other
231self-identified young woman.
As Yunits shows, it is possible for courts to refrain from using the
sex-gender distinction and to respect transgender people's self-identified
genders. The Yunits court does not use the sex-gender distinction or a
host of medical testimony about genitalia. What does Yunits use? One of
the main arguments is freedom of expression.232 This is very much in
line with the gender galaxy framework. In the gender galaxy, gender is
one's expressive embodied self.233 So it makes sense to litigate transgender
cases under freedom of expression.
229. Doe v. Yunits, 15 Mass. L. Rptr. 278, 283 (Mass. Super. Cr. Feb. 26, 2001).
230. Yunits, 15 Mass. L. Rptr. at 282.
231. The 2000 order ends on a positive: "Furthermore, this court trusts that exposing
children to diversity at an early age serves the important social goals of increasing
their ability to tolerate such differences and teaching them respect for everyone's
unique personal experience." Yunits, 2000 WL 33162199, at *8. I would replace the
word "tolerance." I do not want transgender people to be tolerated. I tolerate mosqui-
toes. I want transgender people to be celebrated.
232. Yunits, 2000 WL 33162199, at *3-6.
233. Seesupra Part I.B.1.
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Yunits also uses a gender-discrimination analysis.21 The court relies
on cases in which discrimination against gender non-conforming people
(people who are seen as not masculine or feminine enough by someone)
is seen as gender discrimination. Yunits does not rely on traditional
transgender cases, arguing that this is instead a case of gender non-
conformity.236 The discrimination arises out of the school thinking that
the young woman is not sufficiently conforming to the stereotypes of
what it means to be a woman/girl .
Litigating transgender cases under gender discrimination jurispru-
dence makes sense. Everyone has a gender. Discriminating against a
transgender person because the person does not fit someone's idea of
what it means to be a woman or a man is the same as discriminating
against a non-transgender person who is seen as not fitting someone's
idea of what it means to be a woman or a man.23 8 Discrimination against
a transgender woman (whose gender non-conformity might be that her
234. Yunits actually refers to this as "sex-discrimination." Yunits, 2000 WL 33162199, at
•6. I call it gender discrimination since I do not use the word sex as a noun. The rele-
vant distinction here is that Yunits is using cases that also apply to non-transgender
people when they are gender non-conforming as opposed to using cases that apply
only to transgender people. I applaud the Yunits court in seeing transgender people as
gender non-conforming-and so protected just as any other gender non-conforming
person would be (whether we call that type of discrimination gender or sex discrimi-
nation though, of course, I would prefer we call it gender discrimination).
235. Yunits, 2000 WL 33162199, at *6 (relying on Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins, 490
U.S. 228, 250 (1989) (masculine woman) and Rosa v. Park West Bank, 214 F.3d
213 (1st Cir. 2000) (man dressed in feminine clothing)).
236. Yunits, 2000 WL 33162199, at *6-7.
237. Yunirs, 2000 WL 33162199, at *6-7.
238. Two authors point out that Yunits differs from prior transgender cases by its reliance
on gender non-conformity cases, as opposed to transgender cases. Laura Grenfell dis-
cusses Yunits' rejection of traditional transgender cases and embracing of gender non-
conformity cases. Grenfell calls the former "gender" discrimination cases, and the lat-
ter "sex" discrimination cases-thus reifying the sex-gender distinction, sex related to
non-transgender women and men, and gender related to transgender women and
men. Along the same sex-gender (biology is truth) lines, Grenfell describes the young
woman as a "biological male." Laura Grenfell, Embracing Law's Categories: Anti-
Discrimination Laws and Transgenderism, 15 YALE. J.L. & FEMINIsM 51, 66 (2003).
Sunish Gulati also discusses the difference between what she refers to as sex and gen-
der discrimination cases-using the former to refer to non-transgender women and
men (gender non-conformity up to the point of being transgender), and the latter to
refer to transgender cases. Again, using "sex" to describe non-transgender people and
"gender" to describe transgender people gives more import to "sex." Sunish Gulati,
Note, The Use of Gender-Loaded Identities in Sex-Stereotyping Jurisprudence, 78
N.Y.U. L. REv. 2177, 2194-96 (2003). Though I do not like describing one set of
cases as gender and another as sex, I agree with the authors that using gender non-
conformity cases is what sets Yunirs apart.
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birth-assigned gender is male) is analyzed similar to discrimination
against a non-transgender woman who is gender non-conforming, per-
haps by having short hair.239 This approach is respectful because it does
not question the transgender person's self-identified gender, it questions
the gender norms of society that say that a woman or man should have
x, y, and z qualities.
Using these two approaches, gender discrimination and freedom of
expression, Yunits does leave behind the sex-gender distinction, the
notion that birth-assigned gender is absolute truth. The young woman's
birth-assigned gender is given no truth value. Yunits accepts the self-
identified gender of the young woman and proceeds to analyze the case
from that perspective.
When a court does not use the sex-gender distinction, there is no
ultimate truth of birth-assigned sex to overcome, no need to examine
the transgender person's body, and no need to bring in a host of medical
experts to testify as to the gender normativity of the transgender per-
son. 24 Thus, transgender people who chose not to or cannot afford
gender related surgeries stand a chance of winning. When a court does
not use the sex-gender distinction, it allows a gender non-conforming
person and a person who does not identify as female or male to win. It
allows the court to reinvision gender in a more holistic way, for instance,
to see clothing as integral to gender. Halting the use of the sex-gender
distinction would go far in extending protections to a larger part of the
transgender communities.
IV. CONCLUSION AND SUGGESTIONS
As seen in the Yunits case, courts are open to looking at gender in a
way that does not automatically denigrate gender self-identification. The
San Francisco Human Rights Commission recently passed Compliance
Guidelines to Prohibit Gender Identity Discrimination that recognize and
protect the right of each person to self-identify. The Introduction to the
Compliance Guidelines says: "The sole judge of a person's gender identity
is the individual person themselves and the sole proof of a person's gen-
239. It would be disrespectful to analyze the case of a transgender woman as the case of a
gender non-conforming man or the case of a transgender man as the case of a gender
non-conforming woman (i.e. not respecting the self-identified genders of the trans-
gender people).
240. Anna Kirkland sees Yunits as a case that does not require "rigid medical conclusions."
Anna Kirkland, Victorious Transsexuals in the Courtoom: A Challenge for Feminist Le-
gal Theory, 28 LAw & Soc. INQUIRY 1, 18 (2003).
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der identity is that person's statement or expression of self identifica-
tion.'24'
Education and change are possible. This article offers a few
suggestions.
Definitions: It is imperative that we stop using the sex-gender dis-
tinction as a framework to conceptualize what it means to be
transgender. Transgender people do not have a sex-gender incongruency.
Creating a distinction between sex and gender disempowers transgender
people and raises doctor-assigned gender to a level of unquestioned
truth.2 42 The sex-gender distinction pits transgender people's self-
identified genders against a purported objective truth and gives power to
"gender experts" other than the person themselves. This distinction rel-
fies genitalia as ultimate truth. It leads courts to use classist and sexist
standards to determine a person's gender. And the sex-gender distinction
makes it virtually impossible for gender non-conforming people to win
in court."'
Many definitions of transgender use the sex-gender distinction as
their basis. Any definition that uses both the word "sex" and the word
"gender" relies on the sex-gender distinction since using both words
implies there is a meaningful difference. Definitions that pit biology
against psychology or the body against the mind parallel the sex-gender
distinction. An example of this type of definition is: a transgender
woman has the body of a man and the psyche of a woman. Any such
definition denigrates transgender people's self-identified genders.
It is also essential to be explicit about what constitutes birth-
assigned gender. The assigned gender at birth is precisely that, an as-
signment at birth, by a human being. The phrase is more cumbersome
and longer than the word "sex," but it accurately describes reality. The
assignment at birth has an immense social impact, but it should be
given no truth value beyond that. That impact needs to be 
reduced.2 44
When we define what it means to be transgender, it is important to re-
frain from using a definition that relies on the sex-gender distinction
and to be as broadly inclusive as possible. Two examples of broad defini-
tions: "transgender people are people whose birth-assigned gender does
241. Compliance Guidelines, supra note 64.
242. See supra Part II.A.
243. See supra Part III.B.
244. I want us to stop seeing birth-assigned gender as truth. See supra Part II for harm that
is caused by seeing birth-assigned gender as absolute truth. One way to stop seeing
birth-assigned gender as truth is to call it by its name: birth-assigned gender, i.e., as-
signed by a person, not by nature, not by a higher being.
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not completely describe the person's self-identified gender," or "trans-
gender people are people who have a different gender identity than the
one assigned at birth and/or a different gender expression than the one
that is stereorypically associated with the gender assigned at birth."
Often in protective policies, "transgender" is not the protected
category. "Gender identity" is a common category under which trans-
gender people are protected. One way in which to define gender
identity inclusively is: "gender identity includes a person's identity, ap-
pearance, or behavior, whether or not that identity, appearance, or
behavior is different from that traditionally associated with a person's
gender assigned at birth." , 24
6
Gender Multiplicity: It is imperative to explicitly state that there are
not only women and men. If that is not politically feasible, then we
should at least refrain from using gendered words (he, she, her, him,
etc.)-particularly in statutes, regulations, policies, bills, and the like.
Leaving out gendered words allows the law to be interpreted to include
those who do not identify as strictly female or male. In my experience at
the Transgender Law Center, leaving out gendered words is usually not
difficult. For instance, saying "the person's" instead of "his or her" is
usually not seen as controversial.
Gender Norms: It is also important to refrain from using sexist
stereotypes to show that a client is "truly" a woman or "truly" a man. All
of us fit stereotypes in some way, just as all of us defy them in some247
way. For instance, it may be the case that one client is a transgender
woman who is heterosexual and likes to wear dresses though she did not
play with dolls when she was young. It may be the case that a gay trans-
gender man played with trucks as a child. Putting into record only those
characteristics of the transgender person that fit the requisite stereotypes
will most likely help that particular client's case. But, putting into the
record only the requisite stereotypes reinforces the validity of those
stereotypes and that it is necessary, and indeed possible, to fit all stereo-
types. It will also likely make those stereotypes a requirement for the
next person who brings a similar case. This will make it more difficult, if
not impossible, for all later clients who do not fit those particular stereo-
types to win a case. I do not have a simple answer, but we have to
245. E.g. Ann Arbor, Mich., Ordinance 10-99 (Mar. 17, 1999); Benton County, Or.,
Ordinance 98-0139 (Aug. 14, 1998); Tucson, Ariz., Ordinance 9199 (Feb. 1, 1999);
Seattle, Wash., Ordinance 119628 (Aug. 1999)(cited in Paisley Currah & Shannon
Minter, Transgender Equality: A Handbook for Activists and Policymakers 45-47, at
http://www.ncrights.org/publications/tghandbook.htm (last visited Apr. 5, 2005).
246. This definition arose out of discussions with the National Center for Lesbian Rights
and Transgender Law and Policy Institute (2003).
247. I suspect that we could not find a single person who firs every last gender stereotype.
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consider ways of getting our client's needs met that do not foreclose fu-
ture client's cases.
My main suggestion is to educate attorneys and judges about gen-
der diversity, so that it will be possible to litigate cases without over-
simplifying and distorting transgender people's genders. Litigating the
case of a transgender person who does not fit stereotypes could be part1 48
of that education.
Body Multiplicity: Along the same lines, it is key to stop using
physical and medical attributes as requirements for being a certain gen-
der or as proof that the person is truly of a certain gender. Once it is in
record that a person is female because she has had genital surgery, it will
be difficult for those transgender people who have not had or cannot
afford or never intend to have genital surgery to have their genders rec-
ognized. The same argument holds for other medical interventions and
physical attributes. No medical intervention should be required to be a
certain gender. No physical attributes should be required.249
Identity Documents: It is also helpful to refrain from requiring iden-
tity documents, such as driver's licenses, passports, and the like, as proof
of gender. An identity document can be used if the transgender person
wants to use it and finds it helpful. But, it should never be a require-
ment. Non-transgender people do not have to prove their gender; they
are taken at their word. Transgender people should also be taken at their
word, be able to self-identify. 50 Further, it is often difficult to get gender
248. Jody Marksamer, Wrong Bathroom: The Forces Behind the Legal and Social Exclu-
sion of Transgender People from the Bathroom (2003) (unpublished manuscript, on
file with author).
249. I recognize that getting rights for and protecting transgender people is difficult. And
sometimes, the only way that a particular client can win a case is if medical experts
testify for that client. This is a point of tension. I would like to move to a place where
self-identification counts. And if a doctor's testimony is necessary, I hope that the tes-
timony does not reinforce that only transgender people with the right kind of medical
intervention are real transgender people. The only regulation that explicitly protects
transgender people irregardless of any medical intervention or physical attributes and
relies solely on self-identification is the S.F. Human Rights Commission's Compliance
Guidelines, supra note 64. A discrimination investigator at the San Francisco Human
Rights Commission whose work focuses on transgender discrimination says that the
Commission has not had any difficulties enforcing the Regulations with self-identity
as the only standard. Conversation with Marcus de Maria Arana, Regulation Revision
Taskforce Meeting (Fall 2003). For discussion on the difficulty that medical stan-
dards create, see Spade, supra note 36.
250. One of the arguments against self-identification that I have heard in many policy
efforts is that if we allow transgender people to self identify and to access facilities ac-
cording to self-identification, then we will have many men wearing dresses, claiming
that they are women, and going into women's restrooms and locker-rooms to leer at
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markers changed on identifications because there often is a surgical or
medical requirement. 5' Rarely do identification documents allow for
genders other than female or male.252 Thus, it may be impossible for a
transgender person (particularly a transgender person who is not surgi-
cally altering their body or a transgender person whose identity is not
female or male) to get an identification that accurately reflects their
gender.
Fluidity: Often employers complain that employees need to "stick
with" one gender, and "make up" their minds-in other words, to have a
"consistent" gender. This requirement often relates to dress codes.253
There is a fear that transgender people will constantly change the way
they dress, and there is a fear that men will come to work wearing
dresses. There are several responses. First, what is seen as changing may
actually be more fixed. For instance, a transgender woman who identi-
fies as a woman may wear a skirt one day and pants another. This does
not mean that the transgender woman is uncertain about her gender or
is going back and forth. It simply means that people who identify as
female wear a wide range of clothes. Second, a gender non-conforming
person may wear a variety of clothes that cannot easily be labeled female
or male. This also does not mean that the person is uncertain of their
gender. It simply means the person has a complex gender and is express-
ing that complex gender consistendy." Third, in response to the fear of
men in dresses, the sky will not fall if men wear dresses. In fact, as long
and harass women. Conversations with opponents of Assem. Bill 196; conversations
with members of the Regulation Revision Taskforce during the process of revising the
Regulations to Prohibit Gender Identity Discrimination. This is a red herring. First,
it is very unlikely that straight men will publicly self-identify as women just to go into
the women's restroom. San Francisco has had restroom access according to gender
self-identification since 1996. During that time, the SF-HRC, which enforces the
Regulations, has had not one complaint of a man pretending to be a woman to go
into the woman's restroom. Conversation with Marcus de Maria Arana, Discrimina-
tion Investigator, SF-HRC, Regulation Revision Taskforce Meeting (Fall 2003).
Second, if anyone enters a facility and leers or harasses, that person can be asked to
leave under sexual harassment policies and/or laws.
251. See A. SPENCER BERGSTEDT, TRANSLEGALITItEs: A LEGAL GUIDE FOR MTF's (1997).
252. An excellent policy with regard to these concerns is S.F. Human Rights Commis-
sion's Compliance Guidelines, supra note 64. I strongly urge further adoption of these
or similar regulations.
253. Some policies attempt to directly address this concern. For instance, Boulder's anti-
discrimination law requires that a worker "not change gender presentation in the
workplace more than three times in any eighteen-month period." Ordinance No.
7040, cited in Currah & Minter, supra note 245.
254. See supra Part I.A.2. For instance, a transgender person who identifies as third gender,
and does so consistently, might be seen (incorrectly) by someone with a binary view
of gender as presenting not sufficiently male or female, i.e. inconsistently.
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as men are not allowed to wear dresses, we know that sexism and rigid
gender norms are still alive and well.2" Lastly, I also want to recognize
that there is nothing wrong with change, inconsistency, and exploration.
In a world that provides few role models with complex genders, it may
take searching and time to find our true genders. Because we are part of
a dynamic changing world, our true selves may very well change over
time.
We have to get protection for all gender diverse people. Until we do
so, no one will be safe. As Jody Marksamer points out in his paper
Wrong Bathroom: The Forces Behind Legal and Social Exclusion of Trans-
gender People from the Bathroom, even those who have had the most
surgeries and those who are the most heterosexual and those who fit
most of the prescribed norms can still be found lacking. We can all be
found not female enough or not male enough. No one will have their
gender rights secure until the entire gender galaxy, including the most
gender fluid and gender different of the galaxy, have rights and protec-
257tions.
Self-identified gender is the only true gender. Doctor-assigned
gender (i.e., "sex") is not truth. It is far from the truth; it is an arbitrary
and harmful construct. In the end, there is a gender galaxy. Not all
FTMs played with trucks, not all MTFs want husbands, and not all
people are female or male.
In the end, I will sit ... with butch women, femme dykes,
nellie men, studly fags, radical faeries, drag queens and kings,
transsexual people who want nothing more than to be women
255. Thanks to Kate Kendell of the National Center for Lesbian Rights for a very helpful
discussion on this point.
256. Jody Marksamer, Wrong Bathroom: The Forces Behind the Legal and Social Exclu-
sion of Transgender People from the Bathroom (2003) (unpublished manuscript, on
file with author).
257. I often hear the idea articulated that gender non-conforming people jeopardize the
rights of more gender conforming transgender people. This is the same reasoning that
excludes transgender people from LGB movements and legislation. The argument is
that we need to get rights for the more mainstream first, and for those more on the
fringe later. For a good analysis of this view, see Mubarak Dahir, Debate over Tram-
gender Inclusion, BAY WINDOWS, Oct. 10, 2002, at http://www.baywindows.com/
news/2002/10/10/Columns/Debate.Over.Transgender.Inclusion-29 4 6 14.shtml.
Similar divisions have arisen within the transgender communities. For instance, in
the process of revising the Regulations to Prohibit Gender Identity Discrimination,
some transgender people argued that they did not want to expand protections to
transgender people who do not have surgery in fear that this would jeopardize the ex-
isting protections for transgender people who do have surgery. Regulation Revision
Taskforce Meetings (fall 2003).
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and men, intersexed people, hermaphrodites with attitudes,
transgendered, pangendered, bigendered, polygendered, un-
gendered, androgynous people of many varieties and trade
stories long into the night.... Sad stories about bodies stolen,
bodies no longer here. Enraging stories about false images,
devastating lies, untold violence. Bold, brash stories about re-
claiming our bodies and changing the world. 8 t
-Eli Clare
258. ELI CLARE, EXILE AND PRIDE: DISABILITY, QUEERNESS, AND LIBERATION 138 (1999).
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